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Abstract 
 
Disability Policy in the U. S.: 
Current Challenges and Future Opportunities    
 
 
Taylor Connor Woodard, M.P.Aff & M.S.S.W. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisors:  David C. Warner and Catherine Hough 
 
Nearly a quarter of a century after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), people with disabilities remain severely under-employed.    All the while, they 
command a disproportionate share of public monies through Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).   This report seeks to 
contribute to the conversation on current disability policy, as well as offer short-, mid-, 
and long-term solutions. 
The document opens with a history of the Social Security Administration (SSA), the 
federal agency responsible for setting national disability policy.  This is followed by a 
discussion of SSA’s primary categories of client support:  health care and employment 
initiatives.  The health section details the medical coverage attached to both SSDI and 
SSI, with a particular focus on the Affordable Care Act (ACA).   Next is a review of 
work incentives offered to SSDI/SSI beneficiaries.  Concluding this chapter is an 
investigation of the causes of under-employment that continue to plague the disabled 
circle, in spite of these many interventions. 
 v 
The study continues by exploring various issues affecting today’s U.S. disability policy.  
These include both exogenous and endogenous factors, including the growth of SSDI and 
SSI; the structural issues inherent to the current paradigm, as well as a number of 
disincentives to employment.  
The analysis then turns to disability policy in the international community.  Of particular 
interest are the experiences of Sweden and the Netherlands as they established fiscally 
sound policy while assisting the nation’s disabled.  From these case studies emerge 
several lessons pertinent to the U.S.  This chapter closes with a thorough analysis of these 
European nations’ responses to their ever-growing disability programs, and the 
implications for disability policy makers and advocates. 
Concluding the report are several recommendations that can guide policy makers and 
advocates as they strive to place the disability community on the path to self-sufficiency.  
Most relevant and promising to the U.S. are the passage of the ABLE Act, instituting a 
national Medicaid Buy-In, and establishing a central disability agency.    
With successful implementation of these reforms, American with disabilities can 
potentially finally realize what the ADA promised 25 years ago. 
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Introduction 
Disability advocates, congressional leaders, academics, and tax payers are in 
unanimous agreement that U.S. disability expenditures are rising at an unsustainable pace 
(Burkhauser & Daly, 2013; National Bureau of Economic Research,.  Since 2009 the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program’s annual outlays have 2006) 
consistently exceeded tax and interest receipt.  Should this continue, experts caution that 
the fund will reach insolvency by 2016 (Segelken, 2014).  Its sister program, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), has provoked alarm as well.  Since its inception, the 
growth of child participants has multiplied more quickly than the overall program (SSA, 
2011).  Many have debated the root causes of these two phenomena.  Disability programs 
are under particularly close scrutiny, primarily for two reasons: the recent influx in 
enrollees with disabilities, particularly those with mental impairments; as well as the 
corresponding low rates of the labor force participation of these challenged individuals 
(Vallas & Alfano, 2012). 
While many policy officials and the Social Security Administration (SSA) argue 
that the heart of the matter lies in the appropriate allocation of public monies, those in the 
disability community hold a very different vantage point. The National Disability Council 
(NDC) decries that a mere 18.7% of people with disabilities participate in the labor force 
as compared to 68.3% of individuals without disabilities (Rosen, 2014).  Other activists 
have pointed out that our present disability paradigm damages not only U.S. taxpayers, 
but also individuals mired in a “benefits trap” who can do little to positively alter their 
economic standing and career path under the current system.  All the while, federal and 
state disability expenditures continue their upward trend.  In 2013, taxpayers spent $873 
billion supporting this vulnerable population (Edwards & DeHaven, 2013).   
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Chapter 1: Background of U.S. Federal Disability Programs 
GENERAL HISTORY 
        In 1956, the SSA was charged with safeguarding individuals with severe work-
limiting physical, mental, and emotional impairments from financial devastation (SSA, 
1986).  This governmental entity fulfills this responsibility through a framework of 
support, comprised of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) (CBO, 2012).  These two programs are distinct, yet share 
important intersections.  In both, disability is statutorily defined as “the inability to 
engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of a medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or last at least 12 months” 
(SSA, 2014, n.p.). Additionally, SSI and SSDI applicants are subjected to the same 
application and disability determination procedures.  Following a five-step framework, 
client eligibility is jointly determined by federal and state officials.  Here, SSA staff 
considers a person’s current employment (or lack thereof), severity of impairment, as 
well as vocational factors.   Denial can occur at any stage (Moulta-Ali, 2012).  Soon after 
a person is certified as “medically disabled”, they are entitled to collect monthly income 
support from SSI or SSDI, or, in a few cases, both concurrently.  
OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE  
Falling under Title II of the Social Security Act, SSDI was first enacted in 1935 as 
a social insurance program for those with a recent and significant history of employment, 
and in poor health (SSA, 1986; Moulta-Ali, 2012).  As the ruling originally states, a 
person must have participated in the workforce five of the previous ten years.  Shortly 
thereafter, cash benefits were extended to younger disabled workers, and in 1973, health 
coverage was added as an entitlement under Medicare (O’Brien, 2009).   
Today SSDI covers adults under the age of 67 who have formerly been employed, 
but are now unable to work due to a health condition that is anticipated to continue for 
longer than twelve months or result in death.  Receiving benefits also entitles spouses to 
benefits, provided they are 62 years or older or if they are the primary caretaker of the 
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recipient’s biological child.  Finally, a beneficiary’s child or grandchild may also collect 
benefits under the condition the minor is unmarried, is under 18; is a full-time student, or 
has a disability that commenced before age 22 (SSA, n.d.). 
Monthly allotment is calculated relative to a prior employment record.  In 2012, 
SSDI supplied each beneficiary with an average of $1,111 monthly (CBO, 2012).  In 
accordance with SSA regulations, employed participants may only earn up to a specified 
amount.  Should they exceed this benchmark, their benefits are automatically terminated 
and cannot be reinstated until wages drop below the pre-determined level and a period of 
five months elapses (O’Brien, 2009).  An individual may only receive benefits until they 
reach the full retirement age.  Once persons reach this milestone, they are automatically 
admitted to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI).  This status change does not 
affect their monthly stipend in any manner.   
The Social Security payroll tax is primarily responsible for financing the SSDI 
program.  While in the workforce, both the employee and his employer contribute to the 
fund on a monthly basis. Depending on a specific fund’s financing needs and current 
economic conditions, Congress has the authority to distributed the total payroll tax 
between Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund (OASI), and DI as it deems fit 
(Ruffing & Water, 2014) . 
OVERVIEW OF SUPPELMENTAL SECURITY INCOME  
Upon the enactment of the Social Security Act of 1935, disability activists 
immediately began clamoring for a separate, needs-based paradigm offering assistance to 
the disabled at both ends of the age spectrum (SSA, 1986).  Fortunately, the originators of 
the law made provisions for similar safety-nets to be instituted for physically, mentally, 
and emotionally challenged citizens. Some of the entities involved were Old-Age 
Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally 
Disabled (APTD).  These anti-poverty initiatives were governed primarily by state and 
local agencies, and “jointly funded” with the federal government “under a grant-in-aid 
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arrangement” (Ozawa, 2002, p. 153).  Over time, these programs became increasingly 
more convoluted and overlapping.  At one point, these were among the “1,350 
administrative agencies involved [who made disability] payments varying more than 
300% from state to state” (SSA, 1986, p. 4).   
Wishing to untangle this administrative quagmire, Congress federalized the 
means-tested SSI program in 1972, which consolidated the prior state programs and 
substantially reversed the roles of the federal and state entities in terms of adult disability 
assistance. This new paradigm mandated the federal government provide a standard 
minimum income while states were free to establish supplementary levels as they saw fit.    
Since the early 1970s, the number of SSI clients has slightly more than doubled.  
Also, during that time the share of disabled clients has risen steadily, as compared to 
those receiving SSI on the basis of age. Today, it is viewed as an increasingly vital safety 
net for the disabled community.  Indeed, a majority, 86%, register on the basis of 
disability.  And among those claiming disability, six out of every ten report having a 
mental impairment (CBPP, 2014).  Despite the disabled community’s disproportionate 
share in the program, elderly individuals age 65 or older may, and often do, enroll, when 
they have very little income and/or assets (DeHaven, 2013).   
Today SSI is considered the assistance of last resort and stands as a national 
program that guarantees a minimum income floor for Americans who own very few 
resources. In January 2013, 8.1 million individuals received monthly payments averaging 
$507, an increase from 7.9 million recipients with an average payment of $497 from the 
previous January (SSA, 2013).  This stipend is often accompanied by Medicaid, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) enrollment, and housing assistance 
(DeHaven, 2013; D. Warner, personal communication, August 6, 2014).  For nearly 60%, 
a monthly SSI payment represents their sole means of financial stability.  Households 
with an SSI beneficiary often reside below 150% of FPL, in spite of the income 
supplement.  While SSI is not able to thrust persons above the poverty line without the 
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support of other public assistance, it has proven successful in rescuing persons from the 
depths of extreme poverty.  
Unlike SSDI, financing for SSI comes from the general revenue fund and is 
collected through the U.S. Treasury Department.  In fiscal year 2012, federal SSI 
payments cost the American taxpayer slightly over $50 billion or 1.4% of total US 
spending for the year (CBPP, 2014).     
When evaluating a potential enrollee, SSA initiates a thorough review of a 
person’s accumulated assets.  For these purposes, assets are defined as savings in a bank 
account, personal property, life insurance policies of $1,500 or less, stocks and bonds, 
etc.  Not categorized as assets, and thus not included in the initial assessment, are an 
individual’s primary residence and one vehicle.  As long as an eligible person possesses 
no more than $2,000 in countable assets, he or she is admitted into the program and can 
start receiving benefits soon after (AARP, 2012).  This $2,000 limit has not been updated 
since 1989 and is not currently tied to inflation (Moulta-Ali, 2012). 
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The following chart provides a concise summary of the distinctions between SSI and 
SSDI.  
 Figure 1.  Comparison of the SSDI and SSI disability programs.  Reprinted from 
2012 Red Book, Social Security Administration, 2012.  Retrieved June 
21, 2014, from 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/redbook/eng/The%20Red%20Book%20
2012.(F).pdf 
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Chapter 2:  Current Program Offerings: Health Care 
In addition to providing a level of financial security each month, SSA offers 
beneficiaries a number of other initiatives to assist them in their quest toward financial 
independence.   These fall under two major categories: health care provisions and 
employment supports.  Health care will be detailed in this chapter, while employment 
supports will be the focus of the next chapter. 
 
HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS 
Individuals with disabilities often face significant health care needs and resultant 
high medical expenses.  As a result, these challenged individuals frequently require 
services such as long-term care, social supports, case management, attendant care, 
therapies, mental health care, and durable medical equipment.  Unfortunately, in most 
private plans these specialized services are characteristically covered only to a limited 
extent or not at all.  Further, Medicaid is the dominant, and often times the only, source 
of financing for long-term care and home- and community-based services (HCBS), a 
critical weapon in the struggle against institutionalization.  Therefore, the health 
insurance attached to SSDI/SSI is of paramount significance.  
Both federal disability programs offer health care provisions, yet the pathway to 
coverage differs.  SSDI provides coverage through Medicare, while SSI grants access via 
Medicaid.  The SSDI insured gain health coverage from Medicare after a 24-month 
waiting period, which is in addition to the five-month waiting period for general SSDI 
eligibility, a total of 29 months. Contrarily, SSI participants gain health insurance almost 
immediately.  
Medicare for SSDI beneficiaries  
In 1972, Medicare coverage was added to benefits extended to persons under the 
age of 65 with disabilities and enrolled in SSDI.  After the designated waiting period, 
individuals entitled to this disability program are eligible to the full range of benefits that 
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Medicare provides: hospital care, physician services, and prescription drugs.  But unlike 
the comprehensive coverage of Medicaid, Medicare does not provide many of the 
services important to persons with disabilities. Similar to private insurance policies, 
Medicare is less compatible with the health needs of this population because it excludes  
long-term services and supports as well as extended therapies that can be vital to 
regaining independence  
Despite their glaring need for medical care, a significant number of new SSDI 
beneficiaries are uninsured and remain uninsured until Medicare begins at the end of the 
waiting period.  An equal share, mainly those who are low-income or those whose 
medical expenditures are large, are able to enroll in Medicaid during the waiting period. 
A final group secures coverage through employer plans.  Under COBRA rules, employers 
offering health insurance plans are required to offer disabled workers the option to 
continue their health insurance while waiting for Medicare coverage to begin.  Disabled 
workers may be required to pay hefty premiums to retain their former employer’s plan, 
thus deeming it unaffordable to the large portion of SSDI enrollees who have now have 
little income. 
There are many vocal critics of the 29-month medical deferral period (the 5-
month initial program wait added to the 24-month period for Medicare). This program 
feature often forces impaired workers to compromise their health during a critical time in 
their recovery.  In fact, studies demonstrate that “death rates among SSDI recipients are 
highest during the first two years of enrollment” (Medicare Advocacy, 2005).  And many 
SSDI participants neglect treatments or forego medications in this time when health care 
could stabilize their condition.  Having to wait for these supports further separates 
beneficiaries from the work force.  In a recent year, an estimated 1.8 million SSDI 
beneficiaries were left in this waiting period (Medicare Rights, 2008). 
This is an unfortunate situation since individuals who are recently disabled have 
the strongest attachment to the workforce and thus are most likely to be successful in 
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returning to work.  Research in the field of disability management suggests that the 
longer ill or injured employees remain on disability leave, the less likely they are to ever 
return to work (She & Livermore, 2007). 
Once through the 29-month period, Medicare often becomes a lifeline that 
substantially improves access to and affordability of health care to this population.  
However, due to its significant cost sharing requirements (premiums, deductibles), most 
beneficiaries need supplemental health coverage to fill Medicare gaps.   
SSDI beneficiaries keep their Medicare coverage for as long as they remain disabled.  As 
will be addressed later, SSDI employment incentives allow beneficiaries who return to 
work to keep their Medicare coverage for up to 93 months.  There are also options under 
which they may purchase coverage in a Medicare Buy-In, provided they remain 
medically disabled. 
Medicaid for SSI beneficiaries  
Medicaid is especially appropriate in this context because it offers comprehensive 
and wide-ranging services typically needed by the SSI population. Often awarded to 
beneficiaries at no cost, eligibility is granted one month after qualifying for SSI cash 
payments (Social Security Online, 2014). In 39 states and the District of Columbia, those 
who qualify for SSI are categorically eligible for Medicaid.  And in many cases, applying 
for SSI automatically begins consideration for Medicaid.  Eleven states (Ohio, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Virginia, and North Dakota) have Medicaid eligibility criteria that are more stringent than 
the federal program (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).   SSA permits these more 
rigorous state requirements provided they “are no more restrictive than the state’s January 
1972 medical assistance standards” (SSA, 2013). 
Lastly, Medicaid offers long-term services and supports that can allow “millions 
of people with severe physical disabilities to lead productive and independent lives”.  
And the availability of such services often dictates the potential of [SSI recipients] “to be 
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employed and to be active participants in community life, regardless of the individual’s 
inherent capability to achieve these goals” (Nosek, 1991, p. 2.). 
THE DISINCENTIVE EFFECT OF MEDICAID AND MEDICARE  
To the dismay of disability advocates, Medicaid and Medicare are inextricably 
tethered to the overall benefit packages offered by SSI and SSDI.  They argue this link 
serves as a disincentive to seeking competitive employment and exiting the rolls of 
SSI/SSDI.  One study explained:  
Despite the good intent on providing [public] health insurance to persons 
with disabilities, research suggests that existing eligibility criteria for 
public health insurance create significant employment disincentives that 
[first] encourage[s] people to enroll in disability programs and [secondly] 
discourage[s] them from leaving the programs and returning to work” 
(Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, p. 104). 
Findings reveal that “this disincentive effect is markedly stronger for people” with 
significant health care requirements, particularly those who deem private insurance of 
“limited value relative to their health care needs” (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, p. 104).- 
Validating this is a recent survey of SSDI and SSI beneficiaries that suggests that 
“fear of losing health benefits is the most important reason they are reluctant to return to 
work.”  The SSA currently offers multiple work incentives that will allow participants to 
temporarily retain their health coverage when reintegrating in the workplace.  However, 
the same study revealed that 85% of SSI and SSDI participants are aware of these 
initiatives for continuing health care” (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, p. 104).  Yet few take 
advantage, demonstrating how strong this apprehension is. 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA)  
 
The ACA has spurred major changes in the U.S. health insurance market, many of 
which promise to improve insurance outcomes for working-age people with disabilities.  
Some of the provisions most relevant to individuals with disabilities include prohibitions 
on denying coverage or increasing premiums based on health status, bars on use of 
 11 
preexisting condition exclusions, guarantees on renewability of coverage, prohibitions on 
lifetime and annual maximums, limitations on cost sharing and the mandated coverage of 
essential health benefits.  The health care law will tear down a number of the obstacles to 
private health insurance that people with disabilities typically confronted in the past 
(Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013).  Additionally, in states that elected to expand Medicaid, the 
ACA has created two new forms of public health coverage for working-age adults: 
Medicaid eligibility for working age adults with incomes up to 138% of poverty as well 
as subsidies for people with incomes up to 400% of poverty level to purchase coverage 
through the newly created state health insurance exchanges.  It is possible that these 
provisions of health reform will reduce the employment disincentives for workers with 
disabilities and encourage SSI/SSDI exit (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013).  
The ACA and Medicaid 
ACA’s impact on those mildly disabled will likely be significant.  But these 
individuals were not qualified for SSI or SSDI to begin with.  The impact, if any, on 
individuals with disabilities significant enough to qualify for federal assistance and who 
require wider and specialized services such as those covered in traditional Medicaid is 
much more difficult to estimate.  Anything less than traditional Medicaid will likely be of 
little value to the 11 million Americans, or 22% of those with disabilities, who require 
personal assistants to assist with activities of daily living (ADLs) (PBS News Hour, 
2010).  Therefore, the impact of the ACA on this population will likely be minimal.     
These options may reduce fears related to the loss of employer-sponsored 
coverage, allowing disabled workers to move between jobs or into self-employment.  The 
ACA may also give SSDI and SSI beneficiaries a greater incentive to attempt a return to 
work because eligibility, for public health insurance coverage is no longer tied solely to 
an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity.  
 12 
Yet, there are several ACA policy implementation issues that will affect the 
extent to which it improves health insurance coverage and creates employment incentives 
for persons with disabilities enrolled in SSI/SSDI: 
1) The wide range of benefits states can elect to offer under expanded Medicaid 
and in the ACA marketplace: New Medicaid participants must enroll in 
benchmark coverage plans. Federal guidance permits a variety of options 
about how states define those plans.  If they are limited in nature and do not 
include the therapies, supports, and treatments critical to people with 
disabilities, expanded Medicaid may not be the optimal substitute for the 
traditional Medicaid coverage linked to SSI eligibility.   
 
Alternatively, in the newly created state insurance exchanges, health insurance 
plans must offer “essential benefit packages”, yet states will have considerable discretion 
in defining the contents.  The combinations selected will ultimately dictate how well state 
insurance plans meet the needs of persons with disabilities.   
 
2) The extent to which the federal and state governments will engage in outreach 
and public information campaigns to inform people with disabilities about 
new sources of assistance in obtaining health insurance: As an example, 
research evaluating state Medicaid Buy-In programs, specifically intended for 
workers with disabilities, reveal poor return-to-work rates, a direct result from 
diminished awareness (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013). 
 
The benefits available in these new state plans will strongly dictate the rate of 
participation in the ACA by individuals with significant disabilities.  Yet, at this time, 
there exists little literature regarding the extent of benefit coverage offered by expanded 
Medicaid and the Marketplace.  This is explained by the newness of the program. 
Therefore, in-person and written interviews were conducted with a range of local experts 
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in this field.  The variety of backgrounds among these professionals was an attempt to tap 
into different views and a variety of perspectives.  These conversations included the 
senior policy analyst for health care at the Center for Public Policy Priorities (CPPP), the 
Operations Coordinator from Foundation Communities (Insure Central Texas division), 
and the Executive Director and leader of My Medicaid Matters from ADAPT, a local 
grassroots disability organization. 
While all of these experts cautioned that it was too early for judgment, there was 
consensus that it was highly likely that new health care opportunities created by the 
implementation of the ACA would not cover many of the needs of severely disabled 
persons, most especially attendant care services, long term employment supports, a high 
level of habilitative services, etc.  
The policy expert advised “I think the ACA didn’t affect the identified problem at 
all.” Many gaps between traditional Medicaid, as offered to SSI enrollees, and 
commercial plans were NOT closed by the ACA.  “Attendant care services and other 
long term care services and supports are good examples” She advised that in fact the new 
ACA plans likely “specifically excluded” many of these disability-related benefits (S. 
Pogue, personal communication, July 23, 2014). 
The ACA and Medicare 
The ACA also impacts coverage for the majority of Medicare clients in a few 
ways.  First, the health care law lessened the many employment disincentives attached to 
SSDI eligibility.  Its enactment provided Medicare recipients with another avenue for 
securing comparable health coverage and supports outside of Social Security, thereby 
delinking medical care from employment.  Secondly, some experts have suggested that 
the 24-month waiting period issue has ended with the passage of the ACA.  Due to the 
short lifespan of healthcare reform, there is no published literature substantiating this 
belief. Therefore, the National Council on Disability and two advocacy organizations 
were contacted for further details.   
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Currently crafting a formal statement on this subject, the NCD stated that the 
ACA “might alleviate the issue for some,” but it still posed a very serious problem to 
many SSDI participants.  While they agreed that healthcare was available in all states 
through the marketplace, it presents a cost issue due to the premiums not required under 
Medicare.  The NCD expert continued, explaining that many SSDI beneficiaries do not 
qualify for subsidies and others fall in the “gap”.  Additionally, this individual cautioned 
that a July 22, 2014 U.S. Circuit Court decision in Halbig v. Burwell ruled that under 
Section 1311 of the ACA, subsidies are available only for exchanges instituted by a state; 
therefore, federal marketplace subsidies were ruled as disallowed. Because 34 states did 
not establish a state exchange, their SSDI residents will not qualify for financial 
assistance (K. Borowicz, personal communication, August 7, 2014).  An LA Times op-ed 
commented on this subsidy situation: “…if Hobby Lobby will create complications for 
Obamacare, Hlbig vs. Burwell could trigger a full cardiac arrest” (Turley, 2014). 
Policy experts at the American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) 
agreed that the ACA can assist some SSDI beneficiaries confronted with the 24-month 
waiting period, but most will be left vulnerable due to “affordability” obstacles and 
ultimately have to forego insurance while they wait (H. Claypool, personal 
communication, August 8, 2014).  The Christopher and Dana Reeve Foundation sees the 
situation this way:   
These new options under health reform are an imperfect solution to the problems 
created by the two-year waiting period…..[And] the Reeve Foundation will continue the 
important work of communicating the devastating impact that the Medicare Two-Year 
Waiting Period has on the lives of individuals living with disabilities, and the increased 
costs associated with forcing individuals to forgo necessary medical treatments while 
waiting for coverage under Medicare (Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation, n.d.). 
In is important to note that the current administration has already petitioned for a 
rehearing en banc on this three judge divided decision. If granted, the case would be 
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reheard by all 11 judges on the D.C. Circuit Court and potentially be reversed.  Hours 
after the Halbig v. Burwell ruling, the 4th Circuit Court of Richmond issued a unanimous 
yet conflicting ruling on King v. Burwell, upholding the availability of ACA subsidies in 
both state and federal exchanges (McCloskey, 2014). 
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Chapter 3: Current Program Offerings: Work Incentives 
  In additional to providing much-needed health care to SSDI and SSI participants, 
SSA encourages career advancement through a wide variety of employment supports. 
Many program enrollees desire to work; in fact, “40 percent of working-age disability 
beneficiaries report having an employment goal” (Schimmel, O’Day, & Roche, 2012, p. 
1).  Yet, these work-oriented participants face a number of barriers to do so, many of 
which are unrelated to their occupational capabilities.  They fear employment 
disincentives inherent in the program structure which can precipitate the loss of disability 
benefits at even modest earning levels.  SSI and SSDI work stipulations can threaten a 
participant’s healthcare, force sudden loss of cash benefits, or make it impossible to 
accumulate financial resources helpful to moving toward self-sufficiency. Thus, few 
SSI/SSDI participants ever leave the rolls to return to employment. 
  “Well aware of the enormity and seeming intractability of this problem” and in an 
effort to dismantle some of these hurdles, the SSA and the federal government have 
implemented a growing number of interventions and other supports aimed at reducing the 
risks and costs associated with returning to work. Some of the most commonly used 
provisions involve retaining healthcare coverage, allowing a trial work period, 
temporarily permitting resource exclusions, and granting deductions for disability related 
work expenses (NCD, 2005, p. 9-10).  These efforts reflect an overall policy objective to 
integrate people with disabilities into all aspects of society, assist these individuals in 
becoming self-sufficient, and fulfill a “desire by policymakers to stem the large caseload 
increase in programs that provide cash supports to people with disabilities” (Wittenburg, 
Mann, & Thompkins, 2013).   
  One rationale for initiating this expansive network of work supports is that “even 
a small increase in exit rates from SSDI and SSI could result in large programmatic 
savings.  If only an additional one-half of one percent of the current…recipients were to 
cease receiving benefits as a result of employment, the savings to the Social Security 
Trust Funds and to the Treasury in cash assistance would total $3,500,000,000 over the 
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worklife [sic] of such individuals.”  This far exceeds the cost of providing these services 
(Wittenburg, Mann, & Thompkins, 2013). 
  To raise beneficiaries’ awareness and to promote these programs, in 2013 SSA 
established the Office of Research, Demonstrations, and Employment Support (ORDES) 
to manage these return-to-work initiatives.  Additionally, SSA created the Red Book 
intended to assist clients in navigating the work support system and the breaking down of 
employment barriers.  The Red Book is a general reference source that provides a wealth 
of information regarding work incentives. This volume covers material intended to assist 
beneficiaries with entering, re-entering, and remaining in the labor force all the while 
protecting a participant’s eligibility for cash benefits and health insurance. The agency 
opens its 2014 version by declaring that one of its “highest priorities is to support the 
efforts of disabled beneficiaries who want to work by developing policies and services to 
help them reach their employment goal.”  They further stated “Congress intended the 
employment support provisions to provide…the assistance need[ed] to move from benefit 
dependency to independence. (SSA, 2014, n.p.)  
   Below appears a listing of work incentives as they appear in the 2014 Redbook.  
WORK INCENTIVES AVAILABLE TO BOTH SSDI AND SSI PARTICIPANTS 
Ticket to Work (TTW) 
The Ticket to Work Program is an innovative approach for both SSI and SSDI recipients 
who wish to pursue competitive employment. Once an individual enrolls in cash benefits, 
he or she is automatically eligible for TTW’s services.  TTW’s operates through their 
“Employment Networks” (ENs): private agencies, vocational rehabilitation services 
(VR), or government entities.  These partners with SSA to provide employment support 
to beneficiaries with disabilities at no cost.  ENs enable TTW participants to access an 
array of services that are designed to assist them in securing or retaining career 
opportunities, all while keeping their health coverage (SSA, 2014).  Contrary to common 
belief, there are no caps on annual enrollment.    
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Impairment Related Work Expenses (IRWE) 
One of a number of income sheltering mechanisms offered by the SSA, IRWE disregards 
expenses related to a person’s disability when determining a person’s monthly SGA. 
Qualifying deducts must be directly related to the specific impairment, are out-of-pocket 
expenses covered by the individual personally, and a cost not reimbursed by Medicaid, 
Medicare, or a private insurance carrier.    Items typically falling in this category include 
mobility aides, certain transportation costs and specialized work-related equipment.  An 
individual only qualifies for this credit in months they are employed (SSA, 2014).  
WORK INCENTIVES FOR SSDI PARTICIPANTS ONLY 
Trial Work Period (TWP) 
A Trial Work Period (TWP) allows individuals to test their employment capacity for a 
period of nine months. During this time, recipients continue to receive their full monthly 
benefits, with no fear of exceed SGA.  This permits them to earn an unlimited amount.  
The TWP does not have to occur consecutively.  However, the accumulated 9 months 
must fall within a rolling 60-month timeframe (HUD, 2008).    
 Extended Period of Eligibility (EPE) 
The Extended Period of Eligibility (EPE) follows the TWP and lasts for 36 months.  In 
this period, a recipient receives benefits only in months wages fall below SGA (HUD, 
2008), but not in months when earnings exceed SGA. Once the EPE has concluded, 
benefits are terminated indefinitely if a recipient’s wages surpass SGA. However, it is 
possible to re-establish benefits should employment discontinue within five years of EPE 
completion (SSA, 2014).   
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Continuation of Medicare Coverage 
Once a beneficiary gains full-time employment, they are entitled to at least 93 
consecutive months (approximately 7 years and 9 months) of Medicare, provided they 
completed TWP. This guarantees continued health insurance for this vulnerable 
population, regardless of earnings (SSA, 2014).  
Unincurred Business Expense 
For those pursuing self-employment, SSA deducts any support donated by others from 
monthly SGA reviews.  Deductions may be taken for items such as free rent, donated 
supplies or technology, or uncompensated help from friends or relatives. For an item or 
service to be considered an unincurred business expense, two criteria must be satisfied 
(SSA, 2014).  
o The item or service must be a legitimate business expenditure 
o The item must be purchased by someone other than the beneficiary.  
WORK INCENTIVES FOR SSI PARTICIPANTS ONLY: 
Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS) 
SSA’s PASS permits SSI recipients to develop and implement an individualized plan to 
accomplish a specified employment goal.  Personal resources, such as SSI income and 
other assets, may be set aside and used to obtain the beneficiary’s objective. These 
expenses are excluded when calculating SSI eligibility and monthly benefit levels.  Items 
commonly counted under PASS relate to education, transportation, specialized 
equipment, or resources needed to start a personal business (SSA, 2014).  
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Earned Income Exclusion: 
An Earned Income Exclusion is a three-step approach to calculating a SSI recipient’s 
eligibly and monthly allotment payment: 
o SSA disregards the initial $65 earned.   
o Half of any remaining wages are automatically discounted.  
o A $20 general income exclusion is applied (SSA, 2014). 
Student Earned Income Exclusion (SEIE) 
SEIE is intended for recipients under the of age 22 who are actively pursuing education.  
Here, a specified portion of monthly earnings is excluded from income for purposes of 
determining eligibility and benefits.  Deductions can occur monthly, until yearly 
exclusions total $7,060 (SSA, 2014).  
Blind Work Expenses (BWE) 
For those facing visual challenges, SSA permits earned income connected to 
employment-related expenditures to be sheltered from monthly SSI determinations.  
Examples of qualifying expenses include attendant care services, visual and sensory aids, 
transportation costs, meals consumed during work hours, income tax payments, or guide 
dog expenses (SSA, 2014). 
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Property Essential to Self-Support (PESS) 
Here, the value of any personal property deemed necessary for job-related activities is not 
considered in SSI determinations.  Property intended for a trade or business, such as 
inventory or goods, or personal property used for work are counted.  However, liquid 
resources (stocks, bonds, or notes) do not fall under PESS, except in the case they are an 
essential component of the specific business (SSA, 2014).  
Special SSI Payments for People Who Work - Section 1619 (a) 
This section of the Social Security law allows recipients to remain on the SSI rolls even 
when their total income equals (or exceeds) SGA.  All that is required to receive this 
special consideration is to accurately report work activity (SSA, 2014). 
Medicaid While Working - Section 1619 (b): 
Recognizing the importance of Medicaid for disabled workers, SSA created Section 1619 
(b), permitting health coverage to continue even when wages exceed the SSI threshold.  
To receive benefits under this program, a person must qualify as disabled and 
demonstrate that their gross earned income is insufficient to replace SSI, Medicaid, and 
any publicly funded attendant care (SSA, 2014). 
Special Benefits If You Are Eligible Under Section 1619 and Enter a Medical Facility:  
For those whose condition requires periodic hospitalization in a Medicaid facility or a 
psychiatric ward, SSA permits their cash benefits to continue for up to 60 days.  This is a 
departure from the rule that restricts SSI monthly payments to be no greater than $30 for 
those under custodial care. For this provision to apply, the facility must agree to allow 
recipients to retain their monthly payment while in the facility (SSA, 2014). 
Expedited Reinstatement (EXR): 
EXR acts as a safety net for people who successfully return to work and therefore no 
longer receive entitlements.  An individual who discontinues employment within five 
years after benefits stop may have payments reinstated immediately via an EXR request. 
The EXR provision also allows one to receive up to 6 months of temporary cash benefits 
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while a medical review is executed to re-assess eligibility. Medicaid and/or Medicare 
may also be available during this provisional benefit period (SSA, 2014). 
ANALYSIS: 
It has proven to be a significant challenge to develop successful work 
interventions for people with disabilities under SSA’s present definition of disability and 
the many disincentives inherent to the federal disability programs. 
One would think the above wide array of SSA-sponsored employment supports 
might narrow the employment gap between SSI/SSDI clients and their non-disabled 
peers.  Yet, Americans with disabilities remain underemployed with only 18.7 percent of 
this population participating in the workforce, in contrast to 68.3 percent of people 
without disabilities (Rosen, 2014).  Even more discouraging after several decades of 
these work incentives were results of a study conducted by the Current Population Survey 
(CPS).  In 1981, CPS found that 7.3 percent of the U. S. working population suffered 
from a health condition that negatively impacted their employment prospects. Still 
approximately 35 percent of these individuals were employed while 32.6 percent reported 
relying on federal disability benefits.  Almost thirty years later and in the face of much 
effort by the SSA, the CPS’s 2010 version reveals the share of individuals reporting a 
work- limiting impairment was nearly identical (7.8 percent). Yet, percentage of those 
employed was then 22.6 percent and those relying on public monies had risen to 51.4 
percent (Burkhauser & Daly, 2011).  
Despite major investments and numerous initiatives designed to assimilate more 
SSI and SSDI participants back into the labor force, these efforts have significantly 
underperformed and SSI and SSDI beneficiaries continue to stay on the disability rolls. 
Further, SSA work incentive programs remain chiefly underutilized. In fact, under five 
percent of disabled participants take advantage of the work incentives for which they are 
eligible (SOR, 2012).  In illustration, as of April 2012, 13.2 million federal disability 
enrollees qualified for work supports through the Ticket to Work initiatives. Yet only 
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approximately two percent or 290,000 beneficiaries capitalized on these opportunities 
(CBO, 2012). 
The major reasons cited for the underutilization of these work incentives were: 1) 
beneficiaries were unaware that the work incentives existed or failed to understand how 
they impacted benefits 2) those who were aware of the incentives found the programs to 
be convoluted and confusing (NCD, 2005, p. 10-11). 3) work incentives were not 
available until after beneficiaries had spent a substantial amount of time away from 
employment and after a lengthy determination process 5) supports are administered by 
fragmented federal, state, and sometimes local agencies which beneficiaries did not 
understand  6)  the strong disincentive pull of the SSI and SSDI program structures. 
The disappointing outcomes of these work support programs have prompted 
consideration of new proposals which would support employment for people with 
disabilities before they exited the labor force.   
Still, the question remains: “How can policymakers boost employment for people 
with disabilities …. and what services are most effective in the effort to help them find 
and keep jobs?” (Saroglia, 2009, p. 5). 
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Chapter 4:  The Issue of Growth in the Federal Disability Programs  
What has propelled the growth of disability programs?  Was this growth 
anticipated?  Will these factors be ongoing drivers of growth or are they one-time events 
that have run their course?  These questions reveal sharp divides among government 
agencies, academic researchers, public policy experts and advocates for stakeholders 
(Daly, et al., 2013).  In an effort to foster understanding of the issue, it is imperative to 
open the discussion to all of these entities.  
EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRIVERS OF SSDI GROWTH  
Government Agencies  
In March of 2013, when the chief actuary of the Social Security Administration, 
Stephen Goss, was testifying before the House of Representative’s subcommittee on 
Social Security, he first reminded lawmakers that in 1994 the SSDI trust fund was just 
one year away from the depletion of its reserves.  Shortly thereafter, the balance of 
program funds was restored by a reallocation of the payroll tax rate, designating a slightly 
increased portion to SDDI, without altering the overall tax rate.  Further, Goss recalled 
that at that very time, two decades ago, the trustees of the SSA projected a return to the 
same point in 2016 (Goss, 2013). 
Goss proceeded to argue before congressional members that the predominance of the 
increased SSDI enrollment over the last three decades reflected “predictable” and 
“transitory” factors.  And he predicted the effect of these very factors would “diminish” 
and caseload expansion would “level off” (Goss, 2013, p. 6).   Goss then explained these 
growth factors thusly: 
 Baby boomers maturing into their high-disability years: as this cohort has grown 
older, disability cases have climbed substantially 
 Swelling numbers of women participating in the labor force: in the 1970s and 
1980s, women first joined the workforce in huge numbers and remained; they 
subsequently qualified for SSDI benefits.   
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 The 2003 raising of the Social Security full retirement age from 65-66: when 
disabled workers reach full retirement age, they begin receiving Social Security 
benefits rather than SSDI. The shift in retirement age postponed those 
conversions.   
 A significant increase in the total U.S. population: between 1980 and 2010, the 
number of Americans escalated by over 70 million, creating many more potential 
SSDI claimants (Goss, 2013). 
 
Substantiating Goss’s assertions were economists David Pattison and Hilary Waldron 
from the Office of Economic Analysis and Comparative Studies for the SSA.  In a 
separate 2013 report based on a solid but complex analysis, they succinctly proclaim that 
demographic factors “explain 90 percent of the growth” over the past three decades and 
“94 percent of the growth in the last 18-year subperiod” (Pattison and Waldon, 2013, p. 
41). 
Echoing some of Gross’ sentiments while responding to media coverage on the 
growth, eight former commissioners of the Social Security Administration penned an 
open letter in early April 2013. Citing their “unique insight”, they cautioned readers of 
“the dangers of mischaracterizing the disability programs via sensational, anecdote-based 
broadcast accounts.”  After acknowledging that the SSDI program has “grown 
significantly in the past 30 years”, they reported that this growth “was predicted and is 
mostly the result of two factors: baby boomers entering their high disability years, and 
yu,.women entering the workforce in large numbers so that today many more persons are 
“insured”  (Social Security News, 2013, n.p.) 
The commissioners further advised that when reviewing the history of the SSDI, the 
actual story of insolvency is much less sensational.  Since this legislation was enacted, 
Congress has transferred payroll tax funds between the OASI and SSDI trust funds a total 
of eleven times, and in both directions, to adjust funding for demographic shifts.  “In 
1994, the last time such reallocation occurred, SSA actuaries projected that similar 
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[transfer] action would next be required in 2016.” The former commissioners state, [the 
actuaries] “were right on target.” (Social Security News, 2013, n.p.). 
Concluding their dispatch, they advise it is “vital” to consider all parts of this 
important program and “take a balanced careful look at how to preserve and strengthen” 
SSDI (Social Security News, 2013, n.p.). 
The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF) also brought their explanation 
into the SSDI’s growth discussion in their 2013 FRBSF Economic Letter.  While these 
experts readily acknowledge that the aforementioned demographic trends played a role in 
the SSDI expansion, they also admit “our breakdown of SSDI caseload growth over the 
past three decades indicates that only between 43% and 56% of SSDI growth can be 
attributed to [demographic drivers].  This leaves a significant residual fraction between 
44% and 57% that is unaccounted for”.  The analysts continue on to attribute the 
unassigned growth to “program operation” and the “value of benefits” (Daly, M. C., 
Lucking, B., & Schwabish, J. A. (2013, n.p.). 
Initially, they point to the 1984 Disability Benefits Reform Act, which expanded the 
ways in which individuals could qualify for the SSDI program.  This measure shifted the 
criteria for eligibility from a “list of specific impairments to a more general consideration 
of a person’s medical condition and ability to work. The legislation allowed applicants to 
qualify for benefits on the basis of the combined effect of multiple medical conditions, 
each of which taken alone might not have met the criteria.  It newly allowed symptoms of 
mental illness and pain to be considered in screening process.  And, these modifications 
steered the composition of awards toward petitioners with low-mortality ailments” (Daly, 
et al., 2013, p. 4). 
Concluding their letter, these government experts warn that the effects of these two 
factors may, at some point, increase rapidly and push SSDI participation beyond the 
SSA’s projections (Daly, et al., 2013). 
 27 
 Rounding out the governmental stance on federal disability growth are perspectives 
from SSA’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJs).  As of July 2013, 838,000 persons had 
filed an appeal in the SSA disability adjudication process and were in line for a hearing 
(OIG/SSA, 2014).  Most would wait a year of more. A number of these ALJs working for 
the agency are convinced that this bottleneck is contributing to the burgeoning disability 
rolls.  
When individuals apply for the federal disability programs, their determination 
process originates with a local state agency which has been contracted by the SSA and is 
named Disability Determination Services (DDS). At this initial level, two-thirds of all 
applications are denied.  After this refusal, a denied applicant may request a 
“reconsideration” which will also be deliberated by the DDS.  If the applicant is declined 
an additional time, he or she may appeal the case to an ALJ.  To enter into this hearing 
process is to endure a long delay.  While much improved since 2007 when the wait for 
adjudication was 512 days, the wait in 2013 was still 375 days, slightly more than a year 
(Sklar, 2013, p. 2).  But some claim it is worth it, for here the approval rate rises to 58 
percent, up from one third (Dubin & Rains, 2012, p. 3). And more than a few of these 
judges are testifying this high approval rate is due to pressure on them to reduce the 
enormous backlog of cases. 
At a June 2013 congressional hearing before the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, several ALJs portrayed a hearing system “where there is little 
incentive to deny claims but lots of pressure to approve them.”  One current ALJ referred 
to this situation as “Paying down the backlog” (Ohlemacher, 2013) and another called it 
“Pay so they go away” (Swank, 2012, p. 178).  A third judge advised that “it requires 
more documentation to deny a claim than to approve one” and it was just easier and faster 
to reduce the logjam by approving claims. Although none of the testifying judges asserted 
they had been “ordered to award claims, three said they had been pressured to decide 
cases without fully reviewing medical files” (Ohlemacher, 2013). 
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In a 2013 lawsuit filed against the SSA, the union representing these ALJs declared 
that in order to relieve the massive buildup of disability hearings, their members are 
mandated to rule on 500-700 cases a year.  The union opines that this “illegal quota leads 
judges to sometimes award benefits they might otherwise deny just to keep up with the 
flow of cases.” The judges state “the quality of their decisions has suffered” in this 
overwhelming caseload environment (Ohlemacher, 2013). 
Critics of these assertions dismiss claims leveled by these disgruntled ALJs.  They 
state that climbing disability enrollment is not a “function” of ALJ leniency because these 
judges’ “decisions amount to a relatively small portion of disability awards, 
compromising fewer than 25% of total annual awards” (Dubin & Rains, 2012, p. 2). 
Academic Researchers: 
Economics professors David Autor of MIT and Mark Duggan from the University 
of Maryland have been sounding the alarm over the state of the SSDI program for more 
than a decade.  And in sharp contrast to other experts, they opine that “the aging of the 
baby boom generation has contributed little to the rise of receipt of disability benefits” 
(Autor, D., & Duggan, M., 2006). 
In their thesis “The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis 
Unfolding,” they espouse their belief that SSDI growth, rather than being temporal, will 
rise an additional 70 percent, and reach 6.5% of adults between the ages of 25 and 64 
before finally stabilizing.  The professors trace “the rapid expansion of the SSDI 
beneficiary population [to] three main causes:” 
 First, the 1984 congressional reforms aimed at SSDI eligibility enabled workers 
with low mortality disorders such as back pain, mental illness and arthritis to 
more readily qualify for benefits.  Thus, not only did the number of participants 
grow, but the average duration of disability tenure lengthened as well. 
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 Second, a rise in the after-tax SSDI income replacement rate -- the ratio of 
disability income to former labor earnings -- which strengthened the incentives 
for workers to seek benefits.   
 Third, a rapid increase in female labor force participation expanded the pool of 
insured workers (Autor, D., & Duggan, M., 2006). 
 
Similarly, American Enterprise Institute scholar and Cornell professor Richard 
Burkhauser dismisses the role of demographic factors, such as an aging workforce, in 
fueling the “pandemic” growth of SSDI.  Instead, he advances the belief that the growth  
is “primarily the consequence of fundamental flaws in the SSDI program and its 
administration which have increasingly made it a long term unemployment program 
rather than the last resort transfer program” for disabled laborers (Burkhauser, R. V., & 
Daly, M., 2012, n.p.). In the media and his research, Burkhauser emphatically avows the 
loosening of program rules in the 1980s made it more difficult for gatekeepers to judge 
eligibility and greatly increased the likelihood that marginally impaired workers would 
receive benefits. Burkhauser asserts these program flaws become most evident during 
severe economic downturns but promises they remain long after economic recovery 
(Burkhauser, R. V., 2012). 
Public Policy Experts: 
Things look different to experts at The Center for Economic and Policy Research 
(CEPR), an organization “conducting both professional research and public education” 
and founded “to promote democratic debate on the most important economic and social 
issues that affect people’s lives (Center for Economic Policy Research, 2013, n.p.).  In 
2013, compelled by its mission, CEPR felt it necessary to comment on a widely broadcast 
radio program, which mischaracterized the growth of the SSDI program and its 
participants.  
The media piece claimed that SSDI had “become a de facto welfare program for 
people without a lot of education or job skills.” It continued on to assert as a result of 
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liberalized eligibility standards, individuals “capable of working are opting for the 
disability rolls when confronted with employment challenges.” These claims reverberated 
circulating political cries that Americans are “gaming the system” and the program was 
plagued with “widespread fraud” (Center for Economic Policy Research, 2013, n.p.). 
CEPR countered these assertions which relied mainly on anecdotal evidence by 
stating, “It seems more than a bit of a reach to explain expanding disability rolls on some 
of the items covered in the [news program]…..There is a simple explanation [for the 
growth of SSDI] that “doesn’t require examining the moral turpitude of the beneficiaries 
or evidence of corrupt or negligent [SSDI] administrators.”  CEPR stated that after 
accounting for projected increases due to demographic factors, “the explanation for this 
increase seems pretty clear…Fix the economy and you would remove much of the burden 
on the program” (Center for Economic Policy Research, 2013, n.p.).  Clearly, CEPR feels 
it is the economy driving the growth of SSDI. 
Lastly, Kathy A. Ruffing of the nonpartisan Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities (CBPP) also shared her organization’s views on the matter.  Speaking before 
the Social Security Subcommittee of the House of Representatives in spring of 2013, the 
senior public policy expert advised that “contrary to the impressions conveyed by many 
recent critics, changes in the workforce explain most of the growth in the disability rolls.” 
Several important factors have inflated the count of disabled workers substantially during 
the last few decades: the baby boomers, the influx of women into the workforce, and the 
change in the retirement age.  She added that other factors, not fully understood, have 
boosted rates of receipt: economic downturns, program eligibility, and workplace factors.  
Ms. Ruffing concludes her testimony by insisting that eligibility criteria are “stringent” 
and that benefits are “modest.”   And there is little evidence that SSDI benefits are going 
to persons who could support themselves by working. New beneficiaries experience a 
drop in their standards of living since benefits are in the neighborhood of 55 percent of 
their former earnings (Ruffing, K. A., 2014). 
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Advocates for Stakeholders: 
Countering critics of SSDI and rumors of its “out of control” growth, the 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD, 2013, n.p.) refutes claims of lax SSDI 
eligibility criteria and loose administrative standards by proclaiming that “the Social 
Security Act’s disability standard is one of the strictest in the developed world.  
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the U.S. has the most restrictive and least generous disability benefit system of all OECD 
member countries, except for Korea.”  CCD also advises that “most applicants for Social 
Security disability benefits are denied.  Fewer than four in ten are approved, even after all 
stages of appeal (CCD, 2013). 
Just as vehemently, the Medicare Advocacy Organization recently published a 
public retort entitled “Setting the Record Straight: The Social Security Disability 
Program.  The treatise’s authors claim that exaggerated attacks and numerous demands 
for policy changes have come to overshadow “the real reasons for growth”.  While the 
group acknowledges that SSDI enrollment is growing, they state unequivocally the 
“demographic factors rather than program inefficiency and policy changes explain most 
of this growth” (CMA, para. 6, n.d.).  
 ANALYSIS: 
There is no dispute that the Social Security disability programs have grown 
significantly since they were signed into law, as well as in recent years.  And it is equally 
clear that there exists no consensus as to the causes of this growth.  
In fact, professionals offer a full spectrum of explanations: demographic factors, 
the economy, program flaws, changes in eligibility criteria, increased value of benefits, 
Americans gaming the system, the bottleneck of ALJ hearings, and even a mention of 
fraud.   Further, there is frequent and direct contradiction between experts: The SSA 
states demographic factors explain 90+ percent of the growth while the FRBSF counters 
that it accounts for around 43-56 percent.  And academics dismiss the demographic 
explanation almost all together.  As to the trend of this growth, one expert asserts it will 
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shortly be leveling off, another states it will rise another 70 percent before stabilizing. 
Finally, Burkhauser claims 1980s legislation begot lax eligibility; contrarily, the CCD 
insists that SSA’s disability standard is one of the strictest in the developed world. 
But this much is certain.  This is not a runaway program that should be 
sensationalized with cries that costs are “out of control”.  Twenty years ago SSA 
actuaries precisely predicted that the SSDI trust fund would be exhausted in 2016.  
Further, the trajectory of growth has progressed exactly as the agency anticipated. None 
of this comes as a surprise.  So, how do we explain all of this? 
The Center of Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) weighs all of the above and 
offered their conclusion in a January 2014 brief “How Much of the Growth in Disability 
Insurance Stems from Demographic Changes?”  Almost immediately, CBPP advises 
“there is no single correct answer” to their title query (Ruffing, 2014).  The publication 
goes on to explain that the great differences in response to their question “largely reflect 
variations in the measure of growth that the studies use”: growth in the number, rate of 
SSDI receipt, percentage of workers who receive benefits, or applications versus awards, 
etc.  Also varying are the factors considered and the time period analyzed (Ruffing, 
2014). 
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Some of the expert assertions can be verified, such as role of the economy as a 
driver of growth. Statistical analysis demonstrates that “while economic downturns tend 
to boost applications, research finds that they have a much smaller effect on award  
(Figure 2).  Yet others, such as the stringency of the eligibility criteria, are difficult to 
quantify.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But overall, with so little consensus, it would be foolhardy to respond to calls for 
systemic or fundamental change as advocated by some.  In illustration, one public policy 
organization recently advocated immediate action, claiming that “SSDI has become 
financially unsustainable and economically damaging, and policy makers should pursue 
major spending cuts to the program.  They should also explore the potential to transition 
responsibility for disability insurance from the government to the private sector” 
(DeHaven, 2013, n.p.) 
As policymakers and experts work to more clearly pinpoint the drivers behind the 
growth of SSDI in order to craft feasible, long-term solutions, smaller yet effective 
reforms should be implemented. 
Figure 2.  Applications are highly sensitive to business cycle, but awards less 
so.  Reprinted from Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  K. A. Ruffing, 2013, 
Retrieved July 2, 2014, from http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-9-12ss.pdf. 
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EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRIVERS OF SSI GROWTH  
Since its launch in 1974, SSI has grown considerably in terms of enrollment and 
expenditures; however, its expansion is modest when compared to SSDI. (Figure 3) 
 
Over the last four decades, SSI caseloads have doubled (CBPP, 2014). In January  
 
 
2013, 8.1 million U.S. residents were recipients of SSI benefits, with cash 
payments averaging $507.  Total benefit outlays during calendar year 2012 were $51.7 
billion (SSA, 2013).  In the last decade, program growth has merely kept pace with the 
rise in the U.S. population and the swell of poverty among children (Vallas & Alfano, 
2012). Nonetheless, debate rages among various experts in the field regarding the 
program itself and its growth. 
Figure 3: SSDI, SSI - Disabled Adults. and SSI – Disabled Children Program Costs 
over Time.  Reprinted from The Declining Work  and Welfare of People with Disabilities:  What Went Wrong 
and a Strategy for Change (p. 2), by R. V. Burkhauser and M. C. Daly, 2011, Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press.  
Copyright 2011 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Note: Gray bars denote National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions 
Source: Social Security Administration 
 35 
Government Agencies  
According to SSA actuaries, since the inception of the program, the number of 
blind and disabled participants has marginally, but steadily expanded while elderly 
participation has declined. However, the 1990 Sullivan v Zebley decision spurred 
temporary but dramatic growth in the enrollment of children (Smith, 2013).  The court 
held that the agency, when determining eligibility, must look beyond the current SSI 
listing of disorders and conditions and weigh the “functional impact of a child’s 
impairment” as is the case with adults (Vallas & Alfano, 2012, n.p.).  Responding to the 
resultant surge in enrollment, in 1996, Congress implemented reform which amended the 
1990 definition of disability in children with one that was more restrictive.  This 
legislation prompted a “small contraction” in program inflation, but modest growth began 
again in 2000 (Smith, 2013, p. 25). The Great Recession which commenced in late 2007 
brought about a new uptick in participation. 
In their 2013 Annual Report of the Supplemental Security Income Program, SSA 
experts forecasted that over the next few years, the number of program participants will 
grow slightly faster than the U.S. population, reflecting “the still-elevated unemployment 
rates… from the recent economic downturn.” The program will then revert to modest 
growth for the balance of the next quarter of a century. Expressed another way, analysts 
estimate that relative to the total U. S. population, enrollment will rise slightly from 2.51 
percent in 2012 to 2.53 in the next several years. Subsequently, it will slowly and steadily 
decline to 2.42 percent of the population by 2037, expanding slower than the overall U.S. 
population (SSA, 2013, n. p.).  
In 2012, responding to alarmist cries of program growth, the Senate Budget 
Committee requested that the CBO prepare an overview document detailing the SSI 
program.   
CBO found that in the early 1990s participation in SSI increased markedly, “in 
part because of changes in eligibility,” (CBO, 2012, p. 1) but also because the SSA 
accelerated public education regarding the program (CBO, 2012, p. 4).  CBO experts 
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state that participation rose again between 2006 and 2011, primarily due to the economic 
downturn.  They believe that escalating poverty, also attributed to the recession, appears 
to have instigated growth in the number of child SSI recipients.  But CBO anticipates that 
“the share of children receiving payments for the first time will decline slightly over the 
next few years as poverty rates fall because of an improving economy” (CBO, 2012, pp. 
1-5). 
CBO experts continue on to predict that in the coming years, the total number of 
SSI beneficiaries will decline slightly as a share of population.  They also project that 
total outlays for SSI will decline slightly relative to total GDP over the next decade.  Yet 
overall, the count of SSI beneficiaries has climbed slightly faster than the general 
population growth since the 1990s (CBO, 2012). 
Academic Researchers 
Richard Burkhauser disagrees with governmental assessment of the pace of SSI 
growth. The Cornell professor of policy analysis and American Enterprise Institute 
scholar purports that SSI has grown very rapidly over the last 25 years, especially as 
relative to the U.S. population. And to him, the SSI program “exemplifies America’s 
flawed approach to social welfare policy” (Burkhauser, 2012, p. 5).  Burkhauser 
dismisses the assertion advanced by other experts that the expansion of SSI is partly the 
inevitable result of the growing poverty of families with children and the expanded 
understanding of children’s mental health issues.  Rather he emphatically argues that all 
of SSI’s “enormous” growth over the past quarter of a century is the consequence of poor 
policy decisions (Burkhauser, 2011, p. 4) 
First, Burkhauser, like many other analysts, points out that enrollment leaped 
following the 1990 Supreme Court decision which broadened participation by allowing 
“function” to be an eligibility consideration.  The professor bemoans the resultant 
program growth which he attributes to the moving away from “medically measurable 
qualifications” of children’s mental health such as mental retardation, toward the more 
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subjective and difficult to evaluate “other mental conditions” which includes autism, 
ADHD, and learning disabilities. Burkhauser believes this new subjectivity, implemented 
by lax gatekeepers of the program, is, in fact, a major culprit of SSI growth (Burkhauser, 
2012, p. 6).   To bolster his assertion, Burkhauser correctly, but misleadingly, reports 
these “other mental conditions” which measured five percent in 1983 had skyrocketed to 
55 percent by 2010 (Burkhauser, 2012, p. 6).  
Secondly, Burkhauser states that the above eligibility subjectivity combined with 
the general welfare reform of 1996 has also had a major hand in SSI growth.  He opines 
that today’s SSI program should more accurately be dubbed “Aid to Families with 
Disabled Children” due to the fact that it does not directly provide services to children 
with disabilities, nor tie benefits to the purchase of services for the disabled child 
(Burkhauser, 2011, p. 4).  He shores up his claim by noting that SSI cash benefits surpass 
those of TANF, are longer lasting, and have no work requirement attached. In fact, under 
the SSI-disabled children program, benefits can continue until the child turns eighteen 
years of age, and the parent is never expected to seek employment (Burkhauser, 2011, p. 
5). Burkhauser believes these features increase the interest of able-bodied single mothers, 
whose offspring have medical conditions, in applying.  And he claims, in fact, they do,  
capitalizing on the lax and subjective eligibility requirements (Burkhauser, 2012, p. 6).  
Unfortunately, Burkhauser fails to mention that the program’s optional parental work 
requirement allows for a parent to meet the intense daily care demands of a disabled 
child, while the ongoing enrollment attempts to accommodate the sometimes enduring 
health challenges faced by youngsters on SSI. 
Burkhauser next argues that states have an incentive to transfer TANF families to 
the SSI-disabled program in order to move the financial burden to the federal 
government, thereby reducing costs states would absorb in trying to encourage parental 
employment.   
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Burkhauser climaxes his treatise by stating that “the most shocking aspect of this 
program’s growth is its failure to transition” this burgeoning share of children, who with 
appropriate education and training, could seek employment as adults and “age off the SSI 
program” (Burkhauser, 2012, n.p.).   
In a single statement, Burkhauser encapsulates his explanation for SSI growth by 
asserting “since past policy changes are the cause, future policy changes can be the 
solution” (Burkhauser & Daly, 2011, p. 3). 
Holding a more favorable view of the SSI program is Dr. Lucie Schmidt.  The 
economics professor at Williams College and scholar for The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston (FRBB), opines that SSI “has become one of the most important means-tested 
cash aid programs in the United States” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 2).  Nonetheless, she notes 
that the number of adult SSI recipients has grown 89 percent and enrollment of children 
has quadrupled over a period of three decades (Schmidt, 2012). 
Schmidt advises that, “existing research tells us little about the determinants of 
SSI caseloads, which vary dramatically both across states and over time” (Schmidt, 2012, 
p. 2).  Her research offers clear evidence that SSI participation and growth over the last 
thirty years has varied widely from state-to-state, as well as among states in the same 
region.  She offers, for example, that “while caseloads rose in West Virginia over the 
entire 1980-2010 period, they peaked in Mississippi in the mid-1990s and have fallen in 
most of the subsequent years.” And “New England states, Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island had similar rates of SSI participation in 1980, but diverged in the mid-1990s” 
(Schmidt, 2012, p. 5).  Additionally, her analysis found that the chronology and pattern of  
SSI growth by state differs widely.  She attributed all of these variations in state 
enrollment to dissimilarities in the health of a state’s population, differences in the 
economic climate prevailing in states, disparities in the availability and liberality of other 
programs that can serve as a substitute for SSI, and deviations in the stringency of 
program criteria as executed by SSI state administrators (Schmidt, 2012).  
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Dr. Schmidt concludes that there is “preliminary evidence” that economic 
conditions clearly plays a role in SSI enrollment but the relationship between SSI 
caseload and unemployment remains perplexing and demands further study to “fully 
understand this relationship” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 18).  She also notes that a high 
percentage of births outside of marriage are positively correlated with increased SSI 
enrollment. And like Burkhauser, Schmidt feels that SSI “plays the role of an alternative 
safety net in the post-welfare reform era” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 18). However, unlike 
Burkhauser, this researcher applauds the presence of financial support for these low-
income households which include persons with disabilities.  
Public Policy Experts 
Countering the assertion that SSI has been growing rapidly, the non-partisan 
public policy analysts at CBPP calculate that “until the deep recession caused a modest 
uptick [in 2008], SSI participation had generally been flat or falling as a share of the 
population since at least the mid-1990s” (Ruffing, 2014, p. 3) 
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Contributing to the somewhat stable rate of enrollment spanning almost three 
decades is the fact that the growing number of child recipients has been countered by the 
declining number of elderly participants (Figure 4). CBPP analysts expound that the 
increase in child beneficiaries, as sensationalized in the media, has been precipitated by a 
rising rate of disability among children. Incidence of disability of those 0-17 years has 
“inched up very gradually for the last decade, probably due to advances in detection and 
diagnosis of certain disabling conditions” (Ruffing & Pavetti, 2012, p. 2). And concurring 
with other experts, they acknowledge the program holds abysmal exit rates; once enrolled 
as children, two-thirds continue directly onto the adult rolls. Also prompting an upturn in 
enrollment of children has been the rising rate of childhood poverty, provoked by the 
“prolonged economic downturn.”   
Figure 4.  Supplemental Security Income recipients have been generally stable or 
falling as a share of population since the mid-1990s. Reprinted from Center 
on Budget and Public Priorities, by K. A. Ruffing, 2012.  
Retrieved July 8, 2014 from http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3367 
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CBPP concludes their report by acknowledging there exists one growth-related 
component of the SSI program that can, and should be, legitimately censured. SSA has a 
“powerful tool at its disposal” to ascertain that only individuals who remain severely 
disabled are allowed to stay on the program: the continuing disability review (CDR) 
(Ruffing & Pavetti, 2012, p. 4).  The agency is mandated to execute these reassessments 
for the majority of its cases at a minimum of every three years.  Currently, SSA does not 
fulfill this duty as it should. Resultantly, enrollment rolls can be inflated and incur 
unnecessary program costs (Ruffing & Pavetti, 2012). 
Another public policy organization, Kaiser Foundation News, waded into the SSI 
waters for a better understanding of the growth of SSI and the factors prompting its 
expansion. Health analyst Jenny Gold investigated the children’s portion of SSI, 
explaining that it is “rapidly expanding, with the biggest increase among kids with 
mental, behavioral and learning disorders, including ADHA, speech delays, autism, and 
bipolar disorder” (Gold, 2011, n.p.). Kaiser’s examination was prompted by a newspaper 
series entitled “The Other Welfare” which featured alarming implications regarding 
ballooning participation and some of the children enrolled in SSI. 
Performing their own examination, Kaiser reported that heightened use of the SSI 
program resulted from a “national increase in child poverty” as well as broader access to 
health care for kids.  The latter brings earlier diagnosis and more frequent and accurate 
discovery of disability (Gold, 2011, n.p.). 
Kaiser also explains that children “who were once characterized as mentally 
retarded may now be diagnosed as having autism or another mental disability.  Overall, 
the percentage of kids on the program with any form of mental disability, including 
retardation has remained largely stable since the early 1990s” (Gold, 2011, n.p.). While 
this finding does not change overall enrollment numbers, it does answer critics who claim 
that SSI rolls are packed with children who secured benefits under questionable and very 
subjective criteria. 
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Advocates for Stakeholders 
Highly partisan and advocate for downsizing the U.S. government, Tad DeHaven 
of the Cato Institute, provocatively proclaims that SSI “has become another bloated 
federal welfare program that encourages government dependency and discourages 
individual initiative,” all at the expense of taxpayers (DeHaven, 2013, n.p.).  He cites 
substantial increases in participation between 1990 and 2013, over which time enrollment 
rose from 4.8 to 8.3 million.  DeHaven blames this inflated participation on liberalized 
policies which loosened eligibility criteria and resulted in “a complex, subjective, and 
outdated determination process….[which] has created a breeding ground for awarding 
and continuing benefits for people who shouldn’t be on the disability rolls” (DeHaven, 
2013, n.p.).   
Especially alarming to DeHaven is the swelling enrollment of children “who are 
qualifying for SSI on the basis of a mental or behavioral disability” (DeHaven, 2013, 
n.p.).  He explains that the program’s original objective was to assist children with “clear 
disabilities” such as Down syndrome, mental retardation, and cerebral palsy. He is 
troubled that in the wake of the Sullivan v Zelbey decision that SSI has become overrun 
with persons having with a “claimed” mental or behavioral challenge.  Further, DeHaven 
contends these children will become adults who do not actually possess a permanent 
disability but instead are individuals lured into lifelong government reliance” (DeHaven, 
2013, n.p.). 
Supporting his claims, the author of this Cato report refers to a highly publicized 
and controversial 2010 Boston Globe series of reports. These journalistic essays 
highlighted SSI participation by children enrolled under “questionable circumstances.”  
The Globe articles purports that many low-income parents desire to have a child who can 
“pull a check” from the federal government.  The newspaper supported these claims with 
tales of parents attempting to secure their child psychotropic drugs, which they believe 
increase the chances their youngsters would qualify for SSI benefits.  DeHaven 
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comments “the child qualifies for the check but the parent gets the money” (DeHaven, 
2013, n.p.).  
Echoing a concern of other SSI experts, DeHaven notes the lack of Continuing 
Disability Reviews (CDRs) being conducted on children. The essay claims that number 
of CDRs dropped 70 percent from 2000 to 2011 and that there are currently 435,000 
children on SSI for a mental disability who are overdue for a CDR (DeHaven, 2013).   
DeHaven blames all SSI growth on a federal government which “seems incapable 
of running welfare programs in a frugal manner with due regard to taxpayer’s interests.  
The dismal low rate of disability reviews is clear evidence that the federal government is 
simply not doing its job to protect the public purse by making sure that only the truly 
needy are collecting benefits.”  He then demands that this “troubled experiment be 
ended” and the “responsibility for caring for the needs of the indigent should rest with 
private charities, churches, and other voluntary organizations” (DeHaven, 2013, n.p.). 
ANALYSIS 
The above review on SSI growth offers the only unanimous agreement among 
expects concerning either federal disability program.   
All SSI-related professionals agreed that the increased enrollment of children has 
spurred a rise in this program’s participation.  Beyond that consensus, as was the case 
with SSDI, perspectives on prompters of growth varied widely.  Explanations more than 
equaled the number of experts surveyed and included: changes in eligibility, the 
economy, increased public awareness of the program, escalating poverty among children, 
poor policy decisions, lax program gatekeepers, low exit rates, variances from locale to 
locale, failure to perform CDRs, intentional cost shifting from states to federal budgets, 
fraudulent claims, general welfare reform, and an overall broader access to and 
understanding of healthcare for children. Depictions of the rate of growth fluctuated 
between “modest and flat, as a share of the population” to “growing very rapidly, 
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especially as relative to the U.S. population.”  Startling, both of these last descriptions 
were regarding the same period of time. 
A majority of those polled agreed that the 1990s change of eligibility criteria 
altered participation among children with mental health conditions. Burkhauser and 
others charge this policy change brought subjectivity to enrollment and as a result the 
program is now overrun with children having “questionable” and non-quantifiable mental 
conditions. Others considered the modification simply a broader and more modern 
understanding of mental health in children.  Elaine Alfano, deputy policy director for 
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law in Washington, D.C., explains that there has been 
no great recent influx of children with mental disabilities into the program – the 
percentage of SSI children with mental conditions has, for decades, held constant.  Those 
with mental impairments have long formed the majority of child SSI recipients and the 
breakdown between physical and mental impairments has remained steady over the last 
two decades.  While Alfano agrees there has been a 29.3 percent drop in the segment of 
children with “mental retardation,” from 1991 to 2010, there has been a corresponding 30 
percent uptick in the portion of children receiving SSI for other mental impairments such 
as ADHD, learning disabilities, or communication challenges. “Children who once might 
have been diagnosed with mental retardation are now more accurately diagnosed with 
autism, communication disorders, or learning disabilities” (Vallas & Alfano, 2012, p. 67-
68).  This strong shift is not unique to SSI applicants but is reflective of the contemporary  
understanding of pediatric mental health.  Additionally, sixteen of America’s largest 
mental health advocacy groups, including the American Psychiatric Association, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, and Children and Adults with Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder have launched a campaign to explain the “truth” about the 
growth in SSI among children (Gold, 2011).  
While nearly all experts agree with Burkhauser that the majority of enrolled 
children continue directly onto SSI adult disability rolls, they object to his assertion that 
this is “shocking” and due to a program failure to provide education and training. Most 
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understand that SSI eligibility requires a severe impairment and therefore outcomes, such 
as economic independence, is not always a reasonable expectation.  CBPP’s senior policy 
advisor, Kathy Ruffing, presents an alternative perspective on this subject.  “Because SSI 
participants … have severe disabilities, it is no surprise that relatively few of them work, 
even though program rules allow and encourage them to do so” (Ruffing, 2014, p. 4). She 
goes on to elaborate “Severe disability, exacerbated by poverty, hampers adult outcomes” 
(Ruffing, 2014, p. 4). Ruffing then refers to academic research which presents new 
evidence that significant childhood physical and mental health issues have large impacts 
on four key areas of “socioeconomic status as an adult: education, weeks worked per 
year, individual earnings, and family income.” She then scolds the detractors, “It is not 
appropriate [for policy analysts] to compare statistics” for graduation rates and job-
holding for those who receive SSI and those who don’t. The two groups differ in 
fundamental ways”. Similarly, she continues, there is no basis for blaming challenges in 
adulthood on receipt of benefits as a child. In fact, some studies suggest that “childhood 
SSI benefits improve adult outcomes” (Ruffing, 2014, n.p.). 
Lastly, there is a good bit of agreement and concern from both sides that the 
failure to regularly execute Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) is unnecessarily 
inflating SSI enrollment. The agency attributes this breach of policy to Congressional 
funding cuts.  Between 2004-2008 there was a 65 percent decline in CDRs (Pulcini, 
Perrin, Sargent, Shui & Kuhlthau, n.d.).  And, a recent SSA in-house study revealed that 
for every dollar spent on a CDR, approximately $10 in benefit and healthcare costs can 
be saved by SSA (Ruffing & Pavetti, 2012). The professionals agree that this review 
process must be regularly executed to control program growth. 
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Chapter 5: Structural Issues Within the U.S. Disability System 
Outdated paradigm 
Over the last quarter of a century medical, societal, economic, built environment, 
legal, and technological advances have multiplied opportunities for persons with 
disabilities in terms of inclusion, increased independence and participation in the 
workforce.  Instances of these changes would be improved wheelchair designs and curb 
cuts, allowing enhanced independence for physically challenged persons or the economic 
shift toward knowledge-based employment, offering greater workforce participation for 
some persons confronting physical limitations.  Despite these many modern advances, 
analysis of the present federal disability system, in particular SSI and SSDI, clearly 
demonstrates that the structure of these programs have not “evolved with these larger 
societal changes.”  Therefore, the disability system is “poorly positioned to provide 
meaningful and timely support for persons with disabilities” (GAO, 2007, p. 1). 
The framework of today’s disability policy was built upon programs originating 
during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.  These programs 
were a shift from the previous model of charity and segregation to one of paternalism and 
dependency, with an emphasis on medical oversight (Stapleton & Livermore, 2011, p. 3).  
This 1960-70s protective model regarded people with disabilities as “in need of fixing,” 
“defective,” and requiring caretaking (Blanck, Clay, Schmeling, Morris, & Ritchie, 2002, 
p. 662).  It was on this paradigm that the U.S. government devised current program 
strategies to meet the needs of disabled people.  The resultant system is the present 
programs that allot far greater expenditures to a paternal safety net than to programs 
directly advancing goals of self-sufficiency and independence (Stapleton & Livermore, 
2011, p. 3). And today this left-over 20th century disability policy is “failing many of 
those it was designed to help” (Mann & Stapleton, 2012, p. 1). 
Within the U.S. disability system the dominant players are SSI and SSDI.  
Because the reach of these programs is so broad, their programmatic features dictate 
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overall federal disability policy.  Their eligibility requirements, program rules, and 
emphasis on cash transfers sends a tacit message to program participants.  
The primary eligibility criterion for SSI or SSDI focuses on an almost complete 
inability to work, except in the case of children. It demands extensive verification of a 
“medical condition that will result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for at 
least 12 months and which results in an inability to work at a substantial level” (NCD, 
2005, p. 78).  This admissibility mindset also “fails to recognize that many people whose 
impairments limit their capacity can still make significant contributions to their own 
financial support. By making complete inability to work a criterion for support, these 
programs create work disincentives, erode work capacity, foster long-term dependence, 
and increase poverty” (Mann & Stapleton, 2012, p. 1). Thus, this eligibility model builds 
a very fundamental flaw into America’s disability system: beneficiaries must prove they 
are unable to perform gainful activity and program rules thwarts return-to-employment 
efforts, all the while administrators encourage beneficiaries to return to work (Saroglia, 
2009, p. 7). This very contradictory eligibility framework “has been in place with little 
change since SSDI’s inception in 1956” (Livermore, Wittenburg, & Neumark, 2014, p. 
4). 
This “unable-to-work”/caretaker emphasis in the SSI and SSDI programs is 
reverberated in their allocation of funds.  According to the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), as well as researchers Livermore, et al. (2011), only 1-2 percent of all 
federal and state program expenditures for working-aged persons with disabilities are on 
employment services. The balance is distributed as cash supports. (Livermore, 
Wittenburg, & Neumark, 2014, p. 3; Wittenburg, Rangarajan, & Honeycutt, 2008, p. 5).  
Clearly, this paradigm is benefit-centric rather than work-centric and fails to embody the 
principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act which calls for maximizing self-
sufficiency. 
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Fragmentation of the current disability system 
The hundreds of billions of governmental dollars expended on disability support 
in America are distributed by an enormous hodgepodge of agencies, each with their own 
priorities and objectives. Livermore, Wittenburg, and Neumark (2014) count a complex 
network of twenty-one federal agencies and about 190 programs that deliver support to 
people with disabilities in the U.S.  These include initiatives that extend income support, 
health care, employment, housing, as well as other types of assistance. Moreover, at least 
ten congressional committees oversee and have authority over the twenty-one federal 
agencies involved in disability supports (p. 4).  Commenting on this overwhelming array 
of agencies in their 2014 Public Policy Agenda, the National Disability Institute (NDI) 
lamented that Americans with a disability seeking assistance “have [great] difficulty 
navigating the web of federal disability programs” (NDI, 2014). 
The GAO, in their role as federal agency watch dog, opines that this “patchwork 
of state and federal disability support programs creates pervasive inefficiencies, including 
overlaps and gaps in services, misaligned incentives, and conflicting objectives.”  As way 
of illustration, the GAO points out that initial disability determination for SSI and SSDI 
is executed at the state level. Yet, the program is funded almost completely by the federal 
government. This type of program fragmentation discourages regard for program costs 
and instead encourages cost shifting.  Further, “conflicting priorities, jurisdictions, and 
objectives create disincentives for agencies to work together” (Mann & Stapleton, 2012, 
p. 1).   
Additionally, this piecemeal and disjointed arrangement of disability support 
hampers fundamental reform. Implementation of new and transformative programs 
generally requires collaboration and approval from multiple levels of government and 
cuts across agencies.  These types of opportunities often bind together agencies with 
varying definitions of disability, conflicting program-specific data, and loosely 
coordinated statistics.  On top of that, American disability policy lacks a specified lead 
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agency which has a comprehensive vision, and a good grasp of fissures, obstacles, and 
solutions to disability issues. 
Overall, this fragmentation in service delivery, oversight, and funding can 
compromise the welfare of the disabled, diminish program effectiveness, and squander 
precious resources. 
Complexity 
The National Disability Council (NDC) openly worries that the intricacy of SSA 
rules and guidelines for both of the federal disability programs is completely off-putting 
to enrollees.  The above lengthy and confusing list of work incentive programs clearly 
illustrates how overwhelming SSI and SSDI policy can be.  As a result, beneficiaries are 
frequently unwilling to take action, stalled by programs they cannot understand. 
Following a review of SSDI terminology such as “extended periods of eligibility,” 
and “impaired related work expenses” as well as the program’s required “methods of 
SGA determination” and “reducing countable income through subsidies,” the NCD 
pronounces these fundamentals of SSDI as “simply too much to expect a beneficiary to 
understand or negotiate.” And they label SSDI overall as “just too complicated” (NCD, 
2005, p. 81).   
The NCD finds the work parameters for SSI as “relatively simple compared to the 
SSDI program” but nonetheless determines that program stipulations regarding unearned 
income and assets as “incomprehensible for many beneficiaries.” They argue that without 
expert assistance, “the average untrained person has little chance of understanding and 
applying” concepts such as deeming, in-kind support, or the numerous resource 
exclusions (NCD, 2005, p.81). 
NCD’s overall verdict: “It is unfortunate that the attempts by SSA to address 
program disincentives… adds to the complexity of the program…The rules become more 
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and more intricate and the behaviors we intend to reward [such as returning to work] 
occur less and less often” (NCD, 2005, p. 81). 
BUILT-IN DISINCENTIVES TO EMPLOYMENT  
Social Security beneficiaries with disabilities must spend months or even years 
convincing SSA that they are unable to work as a condition of eligibility.  Yet, upon their 
receipt of benefits, SSA begins to communicate to beneficiaries that work is an 
expectation for them.  Congress and SSA have developed a variety of work incentives 
and special programs designed to encourage beneficiaries to attempt to obtain and sustain 
employment.  Yet SSA’s efforts to eliminate work disincentives have often added to the 
complexity of the entire program, confusing beneficiaries and making them leery of any 
actions that might unknowingly jeopardize their benefits (NCD, 2005). 
 SSI Asset Limits  
Individuals with disabilities confront serious challenges in accumulating wealth 
and achieving economic self-sufficiency.  Of the almost 50 million Americans with a 
disability, nearly 60% are asset poor, defined as having insufficient assets to subsist for 
three months at the poverty level (Lawton, 2011).  National Council on Disability 
chairperson, Jeff Rosen echoes this observation when he writes that among all groups of 
SSA beneficiaries, SSI participants “face the most severe levels of poverty” (Rosen, 
2013).  
Unlike SSDI participants whose “ability to save money and accumulate assets is 
unimpeded by SSA rules….SSI is a means-tested program with limits on both income 
and resources” (NCD, 2005, p. 82).  Eligibility is reserved for only those with few or no 
assets.  The SSI asset threshold prohibits holdings of more than $2,000 per individual or 
$3,000 for a couple.  Any cash, liquid assets, and personal property that an individual 
could quickly liquidate to cash are deemed resources (Moulta-Ali, 2013, p. 1-2). Certain 
assets are excluded, such as the recipient’s home provided it is where the SSI enrollee 
resides and one vehicle, if it is necessary for transportation to medical appointments.  
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Also exempt are household goods totaling up to $2,000, property necessary for any 
income generating activities, and burial expenses or life insurance policies each totally 
$1,500 or less (Moulta-Ali, 2012, p. 5). The SSA tallies all other assets including cash, 
bank accounts, stocks, saving bonds, land, additional life insurance, personal property, 
and retirement accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs into the asset limit (SSA, 2014b, What 
are resources? section).  If an individual or family holds countable assets in excess of the 
limit, they must “spend down” if they are to secure assistance (Greer, 2014, p. 1).  Once 
enrolled, should a participant’s assets exceed these eligibility thresholds, the SSI recipient 
risks loss of both cash benefits and Medicaid health coverage. 
The asset limit was last updated a quarter of a century ago in 1989, the single 
occasion on which it was raised since the 1972 creation of SSI (Moulta-Ali, 2012, p. 5). 
Further, this threshold is not indexed to inflation, therefore its value has been depressed 
with time (Rosen, 2013). The asset limit was originally established to ascertain that 
public funds were not directed toward “asset-rich” individuals.  But, today many see this 
program stipulation posing a significant barrier for SSI participants striving to become 
self-reliant.  They assert that SSI beneficiaries “who do work, generate income, and save” 
for a more secure future can be penalized for their efforts through the withdrawal of 
program supports (Lowe, 2010, p. 56).   
There is growing recognition that asset limits discourage savings and prevent 
families from making the type of investments that can help them escape poverty.  Just the 
mere existence of an asset limit telegraphs a message to SSI participants that they should 
not save nor attempt to accumulate assets (CFED, 2009). 
CFED, a national nonprofit dedicated to creating economic opportunities that 
ameliorates poverty, professes: “Assets limits get it backwards.  Public benefits help 
families get by; savings help them get ahead.”  Instead of boosting self-reliance, asset 
limits function as a disincentive, discouraging persons from savings for educational 
opportunities, homeownership, retirement, or seeking employment---all things that could 
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help them move into a more secure, independent and financially stable position.  
Resource thresholds needlessly protract dependence on government benefits. On the 
other hand, personal savings are exactly the type of assets that enable families to exit 
from public entitlement programs (Greer, 2014, p. 1).  
Savings also create a financial buffer from unexpected income shocks, such as a 
death in the family, job loss, or a major home repair.  These events leave individuals or 
families susceptible to predatory lenders and deeper poverty, and could ultimately force 
them to rely on even greater government assistance.  Without savings, struggling families 
lose their self-sufficiency. 
When given thoughtful consideration, it becomes easy to recognize that 
oppressive asset limits are incompatible with one of the professed goals of public 
assistance: the promotion of self-sufficiency. SSI program rules discourage asset 
accumulation yet assets are fundamental to achieving economic self-sufficiency. This 
incongruity creates a “policy paradox” (Soffer, McDonald, & Blanck, 2010). SSI 
stipulations pose as a serious obstacle to becoming financially independent and at the 
same time the program encouraging beneficiaries to seek employment and exit the 
program. 
In his study, “Ineligible to Save? Asset Limits and the Saving Behavior of 
Welfare Recipients,” Rourke O’Brien (2006) asserts, “If we want current welfare 
recipients to eventually be able to support themselves without government assistance, 
precautionary savings must be embraced as a way of life.  Yet, as long as welfare 
recipients continue to feel threatened by restrictive asset policies, there is little hope these 
men and women will partake in formal saving and asset development” (p. 11). Instead 
policy rules may doom them to living a poverty level subsistence. 
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The SSDI “Cash Cliff” 
A notable share of SSDI recipients who maintain residual work capacity strongly 
desire to re-engage in the labor force on a full or part-time basis.  They aspire to return to a 
higher income and standard of living, to reap the psychological rewards of enhanced self-
worth that is associated with workforce participation, and to reconnect with community 
life through work. However, many policy analysts acknowledge that beneficiaries are 
reluctant to do so out of concern they will sacrifice their SSDI benefits and valuable health 
care coverage.  From the perspective of the beneficiaries, the guidelines of the program 
seem punitive to those who attempt to work and “reduce their dependence” on the federal 
safety net. Instead the rules seem to “reward” participants who either limit their work level 
or do not work at all (Smith, 2013, p. 4). Frustration with this program disincentive was 
expressed by James Smith (2013), Budget and Policy Manager for the Vermont Division 
of Vocational Rehabilitation, when testifying before the House Ways and Means 
Committee: “Current efforts to help SSDI beneficiaries return to work at substantial levels 
are hamstrung by the program’s outdated work rules” (p. 2) and beneficiaries feel the 
program “traps them in ongoing poverty and dependence” (p. 4). 
The National Council on Disability (NCD) concurs. They state that “the single 
most significant disincentive to return to employment in SSDI is the potential precipitous 
loss of cash benefits”, a stipulation built-into the program and dubbed the “cash cliff” 
(NCD, 2005).  The “cash cliff” occurs as a result of earnings above the Substantial 
Gainful Activity (SGA) level, currently set at $1,040 a month.  According to the design 
of the program, if a participant earns even a single dollar above the SGA established 
level, an amount below the poverty line, that dollar will result in a complete loss of the 
beneficiary’s cash benefit.   The NCD laments that the SSDI program “operates in an all-
or nothing fashion”—a beneficiary will either collect his total monthly cash benefit or 
receive no income support at all (NCD, 2005). 
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The following example clearly demonstrates how the “cash cliff” can negatively 
impact a participant’s income as he strives to return to work (Smith, 2013, p. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
The example above illustrates that should Joe elect to increase his work week by 
even five hours, his total income will fall by $620 due to the complete loss of his SSDI 
cash benefit like this as an example.  The current design of the program compels 
beneficiaries to limit their earnings rather than jeopardize the entirety of their program 
support. For a great fraction of SSDI beneficiaries, a more advantageous financial 
outcome will be achieved by working part time, holding earnings below the SGA level, 
and retaining full SSDI benefits and health coverage. It should come as no surprise that 
less than half of one percent of beneficiaries exit the benefit rolls each year as a result of 
work activity (Smith, 2013). 
 
.Figure 5.  SSDI : “Cash Cliff” from the beneficiaries perspective.  Reprinted from the 
Committee on the Ways and Means, J. Smith, 2013,  Retrieved July 22, 2014, from  
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/smith_testimony_61913.pdf 
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Clearly, the “cash cliff” restrains earnings. Until SSDI participants can see that a 
significant level of employment proves to be of greater financial benefit than not 
working, attempts to reduce SSDI rolls will prove futile. SSDI guidelines must be altered 
to insure the work truly pays. 
 
The hesitancy of work-capable SSDI participants to rejoin the work force has 
additional consequences.  There are “losses to the economy in terms of lost output, 
reduction in tax revenues for the government, and most significantly the loss of gainful 
careers for younger work capable beneficiaries” (Gokhale, 2013, p. 45). 
Fear loss of health care 
 In order to function independently, many SSI and SSDI enrollees require access 
to an extraordinarily wide spectrum of medical services and supports which can include 
specialty therapies, durable medical equipment, adaptive devices, expensive prescription 
drugs, etc.  Additionally, a large number of these beneficiaries face significant disabilities 
which call for personal attendant services each morning just to enable them to prepare for 
the day. And for a few, medical treatment is literally a life and death matter. These types 
of situations make health insurance critically and disproportionally important to a 
significant portion of federal disability program participants.  
Private health insurance policies simply do not offer coverage of the long-term 
services and supports that allow SSDI and SSI enrollees with these types of challenges to 
live and work in community. Employer sponsored health insurance, Medicaid expansion, 
and Healthcare.gov’s Marketplace commonly do not include long-term services and 
supports, durable medical equipment, and comprehensive case management. Or, if they 
do so, it is only inadequately or for a short period of time. Even the tremendously 
expensive private long-term care insurance does not cover work-setting services and 
supports or other special benefits (AAPD, n,d,, p. 1).   
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This vacuum in healthcare was recently validated through a survey of 1,000 
persons with all types of disabilities.  The study found that approximately one-third of all 
participants acknowledged a special need associated with their disability that was not 
covered by their insurance (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, p. 103).  Therefore, public health 
coverage is frequently the only affordable option available that provides access to most of 
the services and supports needed by persons with substantial disabilities.  
Individuals with significant disabilities who truly need expanded health care 
benefits are confronted with a catch-22 situation: they require the comprehensive health 
care offered by federal health plans, such as “traditional” Medicaid, yet this medical 
coverage is generally secured only through federal programs such as SSI and SSDI 
(AAPD, n.d.b, p. 1).  Participation in these programs is contingent on having and 
maintaining a low-income. Thus, many of these individuals must choose unemployment 
or underemployment in order to answer their need for insurance that satisfies their unique 
health requirements.  Should an enrollee exceed financial parameters, the income and 
asset limits respective to their program, these health-vulnerable individuals will forfeit 
their medical benefits.   This tethering of health care benefits to the Social Security cash 
programs creates a “welfare lock” (Coe & Rupp, 2013, p. 1). 
Public policy experts and disability advocates believe this desperate need for 
comprehensive health care and the corresponding tie to SSI/SSDI programs both fuels 
application rates and discourages beneficiaries from exiting the programs and returning to 
work (NCD, 2005, p. 99; Coe & Rupp, 2013, p. 1). They further believe it contributes to 
the rates of dependency on federal disability benefits and the depressed rate of 
competitive employment for individuals with disabilities. Thus, it becomes a significant 
employment disincentive within this population.   
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Numerous studies and surveys verify this employment disincentive.  A Cornell 
University online publication writes that, “According to a national survey, the #1 reason 
that people with disabilities gave for not working was fear of losing their essential 
medical benefits.” They elaborated, “The fear of losing Medicaid and/or Medicare is one 
of the greatest barriers keeping individuals with disabilities from maximizing their 
employment, earnings potential, and independence” (Cornell, n.d.).  Health & Disability 
Advocates concurs, “If going to work means losing Medicaid eligibility, people with 
disabilities will often opt to not make an attempt to work and just continue to receive 
SSI” (HDA, n.d.b). Similarly, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) found that Medicaid coverage is 
a strong and statistically significant negative predictor of labor force participation and a 
positive predictor of enrollment in public assistance programs.  These findings agree that 
public health care availability creates a disincentive to work and that this disincentive is 
even more profound for people with greater health care needs (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, 
p. 104).   
Lastly, evidence suggests that for many beneficiaries, public health insurance is 
more valuable than the monthly income received from SSDI or SSI; thus eligibility for 
public health care creates more significant employment disincentives than the cash 
benefits from these programs (Levy, Bruen, & Ku, 2013, p. 102).  Therefore, people with 
disabilities often find themselves turning down jobs, foregoing increases in pay, refusing 
promotions and other economic opportunities in order to maintain access to these vital 
health services and supports.  
To curtail this disincentive there needs to be a severing of the link between public 
health insurance for the disabled and the federal disability cash benefit programs.  People 
with significant disabilities need a pathway to secure the long-term “services and 
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supports that allows them to earn to their potential, save for their futures…and achieve 
the vision of the Americans with Disabilities Act” (AAPD, n.d.b, p. 2). 
 
Chapter 6:  Disability Policy in the International Community  
Over the last four decades, disability insurance costs have multiplied substantially 
throughout the international community.  A number of Western European countries have 
struggled to temper ballooning enrollment and soaring costs of these programs, all while 
supporting those facing work-limiting disabilities. Beginning in 1970, disability 
insurance enrollment rates in Europe were 2-3 times higher than in the U.S. (Burkhauser, 
et al, 2014). In an effort to reduce the financial strain, a number of countries instituted 
widespread reforms that emphasized quickly returning disabled people to the labor force, 
reducing the number of disability claimants and restricting benefit duration.  Although 
these international reforms yielded varying levels of success, they nonetheless provide a 
potential pathway forward as America strives to stabilize its currently unwieldy disability 
support programs.  Two nations of particular interest to the current U.S. predicament are 
the Netherlands and Sweden. 
The Netherlands  
The Dutch struggle to contain escalating disability outlays began in the early 
1970s.  This decade was characterized by a notable growth spike in disability rolls, a 
likely result of their unbridled salary replacement rate. Unlike the policy used by the U.S. 
at that time, the Netherlands offered an 80% salary replacement rate for an entire year 
upon the onset of a work-limiting disability.  This policy also granted partial payments to 
those documenting as little as a 15 percent impairment (Gray & Yee, 2014; Burkhauser, 
2014).   
Recognizing the long-term economic consequences should this continue 
indefinitely, in the 1980s the Dutch government executed a number of effective disability 
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reforms.  These changes were intended to replace a system characterized by generous 
monthly allotments and relaxed eligibility standards with one challenging employees and 
employers to investigate and implement work solutions prior to applying for public 
assistance.  Despite these measures and a 10% reduction in the salary replacement rate, 
Dutch program spending continued to climb (Gray & Yee, 2014; Burkhauser, 2014). 
The next decade brought a considerable narrowing of eligibility regulations and a 
shift to increased privatization of the disability system through greater employer 
responsibility.  With these reforms, cash transfers and enrollment finally dropped.   
Companies were now required to cover the first few weeks of employee “sick pay” (Gray 
& Yee, 2014). Later measures would extend employer responsibility for “sick pay” to 
one, and subsequently two years (Gray & Yee, 2014; Burkhauser, 2014).  This shift in 
policy created stronger incentives for employers to return medically challenged 
individuals to the workplace speedily. 
The late 1990s saw another rise in program outlays, spurring several new 
measures intended to stem program growth and encourage work. First came the 
“experience rated premium” in 1998. This was intended to take the place of the current 
fixed rate premium, a mandated employer contribution to the disability insurance fund 
(Gray & Yee, 2014).  Under this plan, firms whose workers relied on the disability 
program at below-average rates would be granted a lower disability tax rate.  
Alternatively, firms whose workers claimed benefits at above-average rates would be 
penalized with a higher rate (Segelken, H. R., 2014).  This tax incentive ensured 
employers shouldered a larger portion of the program’s direct costs. 
The Netherland’s next major reform occurred in 2002, with the introduction of the 
Gatekeeper Protocol.  This measure required employees and employers to jointly 
conceptualize an occupational rehabilitation plan before employee absence reached eight 
weeks.  In order to retain benefits, the compromised employee must demonstrate a 
commitment to the agreed-upon rehabilitation and retraining requirements.  Should the 
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worker later apply for long-term disability, this rehabilitation plan must be included to 
validate a substantial effort to return to full employment.  
Cumulatively, the “experience rating”, the requisite two-year employer-paid 
benefit period, and the Gatekeeper Protocol fundamentally altered disability policy in the 
Netherlands.   No longer was the focus securing long-term benefits.  Rather, 
accommodation, rehabilitation and continued employment opportunities became the 
primary goal (Burkhauser et al, 2013).  Over the previous two decades, reform has 
effectively reduced the inflow of persons onto public assistance by a total of 63 percent. 
The “experience rating” lowered inflow by 13 percent, the Gatekeeper Protocol 
accounted for 25 percent of the decreased inflow, while strengthening eligibility 
guidelines reduced inflow by 4 percent.  A variety of miscellaneous improvements 
provided the balance of decreased inflow at 21 percent (Gray & Yee, 2014). Based on 
these reforms, the Dutch disability system, long perceived as out of control, is now 
extolled by policy experts as a country which has rectified its past policy blunders and 
today offers a blueprint for others to follow. 
Sweden 
In the late 1970s, Sweden’s disability insurance policy faced many of the same 
challenges experienced by the Netherlands: explosive growth of disability applications, 
lenient initial eligibility requirements and extremely generous benefit packages.  Sickness 
benefits offered an astonishing 90 percent of former wages for anyone exhibiting 
“abnormal physical or mental conditions” that decreased their work capacity by 25 
percent or more (Gray & Yee, 2014, p. 3).  The sole documentation required to apply for 
disability was a certificate signed by a physician.  There was no centralized screening 
provided, so these practitioners conducted these assessments as they saw fit.  Those 
remaining on sickness benefits for twelve months or longer were permitted to apply for 
long-term disability.  Similar to sickness benefits, disability benefits replaced a large 
portion of lost earnings.  Adding to the complexity was the introduction of a new statute 
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that awarded disability status for those confronting extended unemployment (Gray & 
Yee, 2014). 
The 1990s finally saw a measure of relief, when Swedish policymakers dropped 
the salary replacement rate from 90 to 80 percent, as well as required firms to cover the 
first 14 days of sickness absence (Gray & Yee, 2014).  The policy changes continued into 
the next century.  In 2003, program administrators were charged with promoting 
rehabilitation and work supports rather than merely granting cash benefits.  Next, the 
Swedes married their sickness and disability programs, standardized intake procedures, 
and introduced vocational and rehabilitation assistance earlier in the process (Gray & 
Yee, 2014).  Employers were now tasked with formulating a rehabilitation plan as well as 
presenting verification that workers received the agreed-upon accommodations. 
Disability program gatekeepers played a role as well, assuring that applicants fully 
engaged in their rehabilitation commitments. Failure to complete these obligations 
resulted in a partial or complete elimination of an individual’s monthly income supports 
(Segelken, H. R., 2014).  Combined, these new reforms resulted in a decline in sickness 
benefit receipts and successfully stifled the inflow of new beneficiaries into the system 
(Gray & Yee, 2014).  
New reforms instituted in 2008 targeted escalating enrollment growth.  These 
changes sought to re-integrate recently impaired workers back into full-time employment. 
Accomplishing these goals involved a three-ponged approach:  rehabilitation, assessment, 
and counseling. For those demonstrating high risk of exiting to long-term benefit 
programs, preventative medical evaluations were now conducted at three, six, and twelve 
month intervals after injury.  Combined, these policies effectively raised the rate of client 
return to competitive employment and shortened duration on the program (Gray & Yee, 
2014). 
In January 2013, the Swedish government developed and executed an experiment 
that allows existing beneficiaries to return to the labor force, yet retain the right to re-
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enroll in the program at their prior level of benefits.  Unfortunately, initial results 
demonstrate little promise of impacting the work effort of existing beneficiaries eligible 
for the program.  This limited impact suggests that returning beneficiaries to the labor 
market after a long absence is difficult (Burkhauser, R., et al, 2014; Cook, J. A., et al, 
2008).  
ANALYSIS 
When evaluating these results, it is imperative to note that reform in these 
European countries started with overly generous programs.  For example, the Netherlands 
and Sweden both offered disability benefits at a salary replacement rate of 80-90 percent.  
In contrast, the U.S. rate, while variable, is approximately two-thirds of that.  Thus, it 
could prove very difficult for the U.S. to match the magnitude of cost savings achieved 
by these European nations.  Additionally, it is noteworthy that the population of the U.S. 
is nineteen times larger than the Netherlands and thirty-three times larger than Sweden; 
this could impact outcomes.  
Although the above countries followed their own unique path as they transformed 
their national disability systems, common lessons were learned from their experiences. 
Two key reform components emerged that could guide U.S. policymakers tasked with 
ensuring disability fiscal sustainability: First, the shifting of some costs associated with 
disability programs onto the shoulders of employers; secondly, the understanding that the 
most important stage at which to curb growth of disability programs is at the point of 
entry. 
Foremost U.S. expert on European disability reform, Richard Burkhauser, states 
that “SSDI’s most fundamental structural flaw is its reliance on a flat payroll tax for 
funding” (2013).  Under current program policy, the U.S. federal government pays all 
additional expenses once a worker enrolls in SSDI. This set-up offers employers little 
incentive to seek workplace solutions at their own expense, such as accommodations or 
rehabilitation, and instead encourages a reliance on government disability aid. By 
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contrast, when utilizing an experience rating to determine a firm’s tax rate for SSDI, as 
did the Dutch, firms then incur direct costs when choosing either rehabilitation or when 
quickly passing a disabled worker onto the rolls. This type of incentivizing system is 
presently used in the U.S. by Worker’s Compensation and in some state unemployment 
insurance programs; therefore, these programs could offer best practices and serve as 
models.  When asked if experience rating could work in the U.S., Dr. Burkhauser advised 
that the evidence for its success is “not yet strong enough to recommend immediate 
[system wide] implementation;” yet, it is strong enough that the SSA should promptly 
begin conducting demonstrations on the concept (Burkhauser, 2011, p. 111). 
Secondly, the focus of nearly all modern disability interventions has been on 
those currently enrolled in the programs.  But, European policymakers found that efforts 
to return long-term participants to the workforce were seldom successful.  This is echoed 
in America’s extensive number of work incentive options and the resultant low exit rates. 
Yet when the Netherlands and Sweden re-focused their program options on reducing the 
number of new enrollees, their enrollment pace began to decline.  Therefore, it is 
imperative for the U.S. to modify its approach and include preventive initiatives. SSDI 
must begin reform at the front end of the disability process.  They should pair with 
employers to “intervene quickly, provide accommodation [and rehabilitation], and 
empower individuals with work impairments to remain engaged in work” (Burkhauser, 
2013).  This could be implemented by establishing a gatekeeper process that disallows 
SSDI enrollment prior to the completion of employer-provided worker’s rehabilitative 
program. Some U.S. experts claim that this type of early intervention “must be at the 
heart of all serious efforts to stem the tide of new beneficiaries to the SSDI program” 
(Burkhauser, 2011, p. 82). 
Chapter 7: Recommendations 
The U.S. Social Security system is presently in grave danger of failing not only its 
disabled constituency, but American tax payers as well.  The enormity and complexity of 
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the situation calls for a complete restructuring.  Unfortunately, an endeavor of this 
magnitude will entail an extended timeline, a variety of stakeholders (often holding 
conflicting perspectives), and considerable resources.  However, there are several smaller 
and medium-sized steps policy makers and disability advocates should undertake 
immediately to yield a measure of relief until a complete reorganization can be properly 
conceptualized, planned, and executed.   
The below table outlines several recommendations to rescue thousands of 
disabled individuals from the “poverty trap” while concurrently responding to Social 
Security’s fiscal concerns.  Each of these has been categorized as short-, medium-, or 
long-term goals.  Short-term goals are action steps that can easily be accomplished in the 
near future (less than six months) while long-term goals are anticipated to be fully 
executed within the span of ten years.  A detailed explanation of each objective follows 
the table.    
Short – Term: 
(Immediate) 
 Pass the ABLE Act 
 Replace the SSDI “Cash Cliff” with a Benefits Offset Model 
 Raise the Asset Limit  
Medium –Term: 
(One to Five 
Years) 
 Create a national Medicaid Buy-In 
 Phase-out the SSDI 24-month Medicare Waiting Period  
Long – Term: 
(Ten Years or 
More) 
 
 Completely re-structure U.S. Disability Policy 
o Establish a Single Federal Disability Agency 
o Institute Early-Intervention Models 
o Expand Employer Responsibility for Disability-
Related Costs  
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SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:  
Pass the ABLE Act 
As discussed previously, current SSI asset thresholds severely discourage people 
with disabilities from saving for the future, lest their governmental benefits are placed in 
jeopardy.  Recognizing this predicament, U.S. Congressmen Ander Crenshaw and Robert 
Casey introduced the bi-partisan Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) Act in early 
2013.  This legislation (H. R. 647/S. B. 313) seeks to provide a path to a more secure 
economic future by alleviating many of the hurdles to savings persons with disabilities 
face.  This is accomplished via the establishment of a private, tax-advantaged savings 
account (NDI, n.d.).  Under the ABLE Act, individuals and their family would be 
permitted to place money in this account specifically to assist the disabled individual in 
maintaining health, living independently, and fully integrating into the community.  
Funds held in this account are intended to supplement, not substitute, for public 
assistance benefits.  H. R. 647 stipulates that these monies can cover expenses in one or 
more of the following seven major categories: 
o Housing: Expenses for a primary residence, including rent, purchase of a 
primary residence or an interest in a primary residence, mortgage 
payments, home improvements and modifications, maintenance and 
repairs, real property taxes, and utility charges. 
o Transportation: Expenses for transportation, including the use of mass 
transit, the purchase or modification of vehicles, and moving expenses. 
o Employment Support: Expenses related to obtaining and maintaining 
employment, including job-related training, assistive technology, and 
personal assistance supports.  
o Health Prevention and Wellness: Expenses for health and wellness, 
including premiums for health insurance, mental health, medical, vision, 
and dental expenses, habilitation and rehabilitation services, durable 
medical equipment, therapy, respite care, long term services and supports, 
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nutritional management, communication services and devices, adaptive 
equipment, assistive technology, and personal assistance.  
o Assistive Technology and Personal Support: Expenses for assistive 
technology and personal support. 
o Miscellaneous Expenses: Financial management and administrative 
services, legal fees, expenses for oversight, monitoring, or funeral and 
burial expenses (National Down Syndrome, 2013, n.p.).  
 
Housed within Section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code for Qualified Tuition 
Plans, ABLE accounts adhere to the same guidelines as a traditional 529 qualified tuition 
program. Earnings from the account are not subject to taxation.  Additionally, this income 
has no effect on eligibility for most federal assistance programs, including SSI/SSDI, up 
to a specific point.  However, once accumulated assets reach $100,000, a temporary 
termination of monthly benefits occurs.  When the account drops below the designate 
threshold again, benefits are automatically reinstated.  In contrast, Medicaid benefits are 
never subject to suspension, regardless of the account’s current value (NDI, n.d.).   
Replace the “Cash Cliff” with a Benefits Offset Model  
SSDI is long overdue for modifications in program design.  Currently, many 
beneficiaries continue to forego employment or suppress their earnings out of fear of 
benefit forfeiture. Therefore, policymakers should legislate changes to the SSDI program 
that will boost workforce participation among disabled participants and lead to their exit 
from or reduction in their reliance on the program. This can be accomplished through 
more effective work incentives. 
Recovery from an injury or disabling condition, if it occurs, is often gradual.  
Participants do not usually go from being severely impaired to fully employable in a 
matter of months.  Similarly, exit from the SSDI program often will need to be 
progressive rather than the “sudden cutoff” as is precipitated by the “cash cliff” (Rich, 
2011).  An alternative and better fitting approach to SSDI earnings is referred to as a 
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benefit offset policy or graduated earning offset (Smith, 2013).  Here benefits slowly 
decrease as the beneficiary’s earnings increase.  The SSI program has such an earnings 
feature which has been in place of the last thirty years, therefore this is not an “untested 
approach” (Smith, 2013, n.p.). 
The “concept…is…very simple”.  First, a threshold or earning disregard level for 
beneficiaries is established.  Then, any earnings above that threshold effectively reduce 
an individual’s monthly benefits:  for each $2 increase in wages, a $1 offset in benefits 
occurs.  Thus, a person is always better off financially the more they work and earn.  It 
provides a clear and simple incentive” for the beneficiary to attempt to work as much as 
they are able (Smith, 2013, n. p.). 
Removing this barrier to renewed participation in the labor force will spawn direct 
and positive benefits not only to the SSDI participants themselves but will also generate 
savings to the SSA and spur the overall American economy. 
Raise the SSI Asset Limit  
     Pass legislation that will raise the SSI asset limit to a modest $10,000 for individuals 
and $15,000 for couples.  Index this asset threshold to inflation to allow the limit to grow 
over time with the economy. In addition, exempt long-term investments, such as 
retirement accounts, health savings accounts, and education savings accounts.  
The National Council on Disability (NCD), independent federal agency and advisor 
on disability policy for the President and Congress, rightfully counsels, “While 
employment is certainly a critical pathway to self-sufficiency, [researchers] argue that 
people move out of poverty by saving and investing, not by income generation alone” 
(NCD, 2005, p. 84). Therefore, it is imperative to liberalize the SSI asset limit.  By 
raising this limit to this modest threshold, SSI beneficiaries will be encouraged to pursue 
work, save for post-secondary education, purchase a home, and save for retirement, all 
steps that will help them get off, and stay off of public benefit programs. 
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Studies demonstrate that “asset holding yields improved household economic 
stability, increased long-term planning, greater educational attainment, reduced inter-
generational poverty and civic engagement” (Grinstein-Weiss, Parish, Rimmerman, Rose, 
& Yeo, 2010, Literature Review section, para. 4). Similarly, the Pew Economic Mobility 
Project learned that children having low-income parents who were high savers 
experienced much greater “upward economic mobility than children of low-income low-
saving parents” (Hiatt & Newcomer, 2010, p. 5). This research clearly points to the 
accumulation of assets as a clear promoter of the financial and social mobility for which 
SSI recipients and the SSA are striving. As a bonus, unlike most other efforts targeting 
aspects of poverty and requiring complex and costly policy solutions, raising asset limits 
costs nothing and is expected to increase exit rates of current SSI participants. 
NCD predicts this long sought after reform will enhance the “ability of SSI 
beneficiaries to find and maintain employment and thereby improve both their quality of 
life and the solvency of the program” in which they are enrolled (Rosen, 2013). 
MEDIUM –TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:  
Create a national Medicaid Buy-In 
     Congress should authorize a national Medicaid Buy-In which would enable disabled 
workers to secure comprehensive health care that  has been decoupled from the cash 
benefits of  SSI and SSDI. This initiative would replace state Medicaid Buy-Ins and offer 
uniform health care to many working persons with disabilities.  The program would be 
designed to offer equal access to health insurance; provide health care portability across 
state lines in support of employment mobility; and decrease participation in federal cash 
benefit programs (HDA, n.d.a, Point by Point section). 
 
Approximately 17 million Americans with disabilities collect SSI and SSDI federal 
disability income support payments monthly (SSA, 2014).  Many of these persons 
strongly desire to transition to a greater degree of self-sufficiency through either a 
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return-to-work or an increased level of work. However, for an individual with a 
disability, the wish and willingness to work is frequently overshadowed by the fear of 
losing health coverage that addresses their special health care needs (HDA, n.d.b, 
Background section). This apprehension is the product of the existing link between cash 
benefits and health care provisions built into the design of federal programs. Thus, this 
connection erects a major barrier to employment 
 
Acknowledging this disincentive to employment and desiring to improve workforce 
outcomes for persons with disabilities, in the late 1990s, Congress authorized the 
establishment of state Medicaid Buy-In (MBI) programs. This breakthrough legislation 
was “a key component of a federal effort” to allow participants with disabilities to pursue 
work and move toward a greater level of economic independence without concern of 
sacrificing vital health benefits. To be eligible for a state Buy-In program, an individual 
must have a disability as defined by the SSA, must generate earned income, and must 
meet other financial eligibility requirements established by their state (Davis & Irays, 
2006, p. 1). 
Current Medicaid Buy-Ins at the State Level 
This work incentive option allows states to expand Medicaid coverage to include 
working individuals with disabilities whose income and assets would otherwise make 
them ineligible for traditional Medicaid.  The higher income and resource limits act as an 
incentive for people with disabilities to work less restrictively, earn more money, and exit 
the SSA rolls. Just like a regular insurance program participants pay a monthly premium, 
usually decided on a sliding scale, in exchange for their Medicaid coverage, thus the term 
“buy-in.” 
The state MBI was authorized by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and the 
Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (TWWIIAA) and is 
overseen by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The legislation 
gives state agencies great discretion in the structure and operation of their Buy-In 
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program.  This “flexibility has led to considerable variation in program design and 
outcomes among the states” (Kehn, 2013, p. vii). 
As of April 2014, forty-six states had implemented this option and created MBI 
programs. States without a MBI are Florida, Tennessee, Hawaii, Alabama, and the 
District of Columbia (NDNRC, 2014).  The American Association of People with 
Disabilities tallies that there are approximately 200,000 workers with disabilities 
currently working and receiving the needed health care as a result of this program 
(AADP, n.d.b, Proposal Three, para. 1). 
Analysis of these state MBIs show enrollees “earn more money, work more hours, 
contribute more in taxes, and rely less on food stamps than people with disabilities who 
are not enrolled” (Gavin, McCoy-Roth, & Gidugu, 2011, Plain language summary 
section, para. 3).  More specifically, Lui and Weathers (2007) found that approximately 
40 percent of MBI participants increased their wages after enrolling in the program, but 
these researchers also noted there were “substantial differences across states” (p. 2). 
Additionally, in a study “Does Access to Health Insurance Influence Work Effort among 
Disability Cash Benefit Recipients?”, Coe and Rupp (2013) validated that Medicaid Buy-
In programs ameliorate the aforementioned “welfare lock” disincentive (p. 26).  Despite 
these encouraging results, state MBIs are not without problems. 
Although current MBI programs have greatly enhanced opportunities for persons with 
disabilities to work, the large cross-state deviations in enrollment criteria and some 
design flaws have limited the effectiveness of these programs (AADP, n.d.b, Proposal 
Three section, para.2).  Additionally, take-up rates in many states are stunted, postulated 
to be the result of poor public awareness (NCD, 2005, p. 100). Because each state designs 
their own program, income limits vary from a low of 80 percent of FPL up to unlimited 
income.  As a result, a hopeful MBI applicant may be able to participate in Colorado 
where the income limit is 450 percent of FPL (Colordo.gov, n.d.), but not in Texas where 
it is 250 percent of FPL (Texas HHSC, 2011, p. 2) or in Florida which has no MBI at all 
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(HDA, 2013, n.d.c.). These eligibility inconsistencies can preclude an individual from 
even considering relocating to another state for a better employment position.  A similar 
issue exists among resource limits which span from a low at the SSI limit of $2,000, up to 
a completely unrestricted possession of assets (AAPD, n.d.b, Proposal Three section, 
para. 2). 
Participants in many states find the program complex and difficult to understand.  
And work support features, such as employment counseling are often underfunded. 
(Gavin, McCoy-Roth, & Gidugu, 2011, Plain language summary section, para. 4).  Also, 
should a participant need time off due to health or any other reason, no grace period 
exists and the beneficiary is immediately terminated at the end of the month in which 
their employment status is changed. Additional weaknesses with the state MBIs are the 
absence of a pathway back to regular Medicaid if a person accumulates resources while 
participating in MBI and the uncertainty regarding eligibility for Medicaid at age 65 
(AAPD, n.d.b, Proposal Three section, para. 3).  Together these limitations serve as 
disincentives, making individuals with disabilities less likely to attempt this option. 
The Need for a National MBI 
Almost a quarter of a century after the passage of the ADA, the “employment 
opportunities envisioned for individuals with disabilities has failed to materialize, in part 
because of the inaccessibility of comprehensive health care coverage” (HDA, n.d.b, 
Background section).  But many continue to trust with the “right tools, Americans with 
disabilities can live independently in their homes, increase their earnings, and contribute 
to the growth of our economy as taxpayers, consumers, and small business owners” 
(AAPD, n.d.a, para. 4). 
Capitalizing on what has been learned from state MBIs, it is now imperative to 
implement a national Medicaid Buy-In where workforce opportunities rather than income 
or asset limits determine an individual’s career direction. And under a national Buy-In, a 
person’s career path will no longer be dictated by keeping health care (AAPD, n.d.b, 
Proposal One section, para.4). The program should be presented as a work incentive 
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initiative, rather than another health coverage plan.  This would be confirmed by the work 
requirement of the MBI, something absent all other Medicaid programs.  The national 
MBI will be administered by SSA and overseen by CMS. 
The initiative will be strictly limited to individuals who are disabled and working.  
Every enrollee will be considered a family of one and the health care coverage will not 
extend to other family members or the beneficiary’s children.  Participants must meet the 
Social Security criteria for disability or for those not currently in a federal disability 
program, by a state disability determination. 
Participation financial constraints will be an adjusted (employing SSA 
calculations) individual income at or below 450 percent of FPL.  This elevated ceiling is 
reflective of lessons learned from the state MBIs.  Higher income and assets limits attract 
participants who are more financially stable and who are much more likely to succeed in 
the job market and not return to disability rolls (Gavin, McCoy-Roth, & Gidugu, 2011). 
There will be no asset limits. Premiums will be assessed on a sliding scale based on 
income.  Some low-income participants will pay nothing, as is currently the case with 
federal disability programs; others will be levied 100 percent of program costs.  The 
program will offer disregards for any assets accrued during MBI participation should the 
individual no longer be able to work. Age parameters will span from eighteen years of 
age through the SSA’s designated retirement age. Grace periods for unemployment that 
“recognizes the episodic nature of many disabilities” will be instituted.  Lastly, there will 
be a designated avenue back to previous health insurance, minimizing the risk for 
attempting to return to the workforce (AAPD, n.d.b, Proposal Three section, para. 3). 
This national Medicaid Buy-In is anticipated to have the following benefits:  
enhanced health outcomes, a sense of independence and other social and emotional 
benefits associated with employment; decreased enrollment in SSI and SSDI; overall 
lower costs for the government as contrasted to reliance on public cash benefits and total 
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financial responsibility for medical insurance costs; and the recovery of previously 
foregone tax revenues due to these workers remaining out of the labor market 
Phase-out the SSDI 24-month Waiting Period for Medicare Benefits 
Over a ten-year span, Congress should phase-out the two-year waiting period which 
SSDI beneficiaries must pass through prior to being eligible for Medicare health benefits.  
Simultaneously, they should institute a pathway which allows for immediate qualification 
to Medicare for SSDI beneficiaries experiencing a life-threatening illness. 
 
SSDI’s primary objective is to afford a safety net for workers experiencing 
employment interruption due to a serious disability.  Regrettably, there exists a hole in 
this safety net.  While SSDI does provide Medicare benefits to its participants, 
beneficiaries must first endure 24-month waiting period prior to the onset of coverage.  In 
fact, these individuals confront three sequential waiting periods before they are able to 
access benefits: 
o First, SSDI applicants must proceed through the disability determination 
process overseen by the SSA in order to certify they have a qualifying 
disability.  This often spans months. 
o Second, SSDI rules specify that once certified, applicants must wait five 
months prior to actual enrollment in the program and the commencement 
of cash benefits. 
o Third, once cash benefits initiate, SSDI participants must wait an 
additional 24 months before the onset of Medicare coverage. 
 
Essentially, medical assistance for the above persons is postponed for 
approximately three years.  Research from the National Health Interview Survey, tied to 
both SSDI and Medicare, found that during this period “beneficiaries experienced 
dramatic changes, including marked decline in health” (Livermore, Stapleton, & 
Claypool, 2009, p. 1).  At a time when medical assistance is most needed, SSDI 
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beneficiaries are often found to be foregoing medications and delaying necessary 
physician care.  
Two important studies showed that “Individuals in the waiting period for 
Medicare suffer from a broad range of debilitating diseases and are in urgent need of 
appropriate medical care to manage their conditions”  (Center for Medicare Advocacy, 
2005).  Tragically, an estimated 13% of SSDI new entrants pass away prior to completing 
the waiting period.  Throughout their working lives, these workers steadily contributed to 
Medicare payroll taxes and yet never realized a benefit (Livermore, Stapleton, & 
Claypool, 2009, p. 2).  
It is believed that immediate access to healthcare would yield better outcomes 
through improved health and earlier return to the labor force, thus, reducing costs and 
paring the SSDI rolls.  Additionally, with increased returns-to-work would come growing 
federal payroll and income tax revenues, bolstering the economy. 
LONG–TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:  
It is clearly time to craft an entirely new vision for America’s disability programs. In 
spite of increased outlays across numerous decades, the U.S. disability support structure 
is failing many of those it was created to assist. As a result their economic outcomes and 
independence has eroded.  Additionally, these programs are imposing fiscal pressures on 
our nation’s economy. Clearly today’s disability paradigm is outdated and fails to 
fundamentally solve the problems it was designed to address. Adding more small changes 
will simply increase the complexity of the program.  And failure to address the 
underlying structural issues will perpetuate program inefficiencies and poor outcomes.   
This new visions will involve a major structural change that must not be executed in 
haste and must be based on solid evidence. Poorly conceived policies could harm the 
disabled population as well as fail to reduce expenditure growth.  This restructuring 
should take place over a full decade and would involve the following: 
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 The appointment of a central federal agency which would develop 
disability policy and lead the reform.  This will remedy the current lack of 
leadership and create a single point of contact. It will also entail making 
disability employment a priority at the federal level and would end policy 
fragmentation, decrease complexity for participants, and curb growing 
administration costs. 
 
After this agency is designated, it should commence a substantial demonstration 
period during which federal, state, local, and private agencies collaborate to design a 
contemporary disability program infrastructure. They will also seek solutions to old 
problems, conceptualizing new programs which incorporate one or more of the following 
principles. 
Shifting the focus of disability programs from benefit-centric to work-centric 
It is imperative to change program entry criteria away from demonstrating near total 
disability to emphasizing remaining work capacity.  Focus will move from income and 
in-kind benefits to work supports and economic self-sufficiency. 
Implementing early intervention strategies by instituting employer-involvement models 
These programs would shift the focus away from currently enrolled beneficiaries and 
concentrate on stemming new enrollment. Employers would be charged with developing 
rehabilitation and accommodation plans in the initial stages of the worker’s impairment 
and prior to the worker exiting the workforce. 
Progressively expanding employer responsibility for costs associated with employee 
disability benefits  
Building on European paradigms of experience ratings, design a demonstration that will 
levy surcharges on SSDI payroll taxes for companies with an above average rate of 
employees progressing onto SSDI roles while lowering the payroll taxes of employers 
whose workers claimed benefits at below average rates.  This would incentivize firms to 
participate in policies that promote continued work. 
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The fiscal implications of these reforms could yield federal cost savings by 
increasing the lifetime earnings of and tax outlays by those with work capacity, reducing 
dependence on public support, and by ending fragmentation and overlaps in the federal 
disability programs.  
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